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The 1970s were stormy years in the entire world. They saw the introduction of the so 
called ‘détente’  ̶a policy aiming at relaxing strain between the two world superpowers 
in the context of the Cold War ̶ proposed by the American President Richard Nixon, his 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the General Secretary of the soviet Communist 
Party Leonid Brezhnev. Yet, this decade saw also the crisis of such a policy. With 
Nixon’s resignation, the American position in the international background became 
weak, thus affecting negatively the easing of tension between the USA and Moscow. To 
the weakening of the American power, a gradual change of direction followed the 
political landscape ̶ leftist parties reached governmental position in Germany and Great 
Britain. 
Even in Italy, the Communist Party was becoming popular, achieving a broad consensus 
at first in the 1975 local elections, and then in the general elections in 1976. Although 
the feared ‘sorpasso’ did not happen, the US Administration kept supervising the Italian 
political situation strictly, promoting harsh measures as a stern warning against the 
participation of the Communists in the Italian Government and trying to involve other 
European countries in such provisions. Whereas Germany and France showed a total 
approval for the American stance during the inter-governmental meeting in Puerto Rico 
in 1976, Great Britain was puzzled at such an undue interference on a democratic state 
by other nations that were supposed to by allies. 
Despite the Italian Communists were actually increasing their popularity, the worsening 
conditions of law and order in Italy were considered by London a more serious problem 
than an unlikely Red Government. 
Political violence and ordinary crimes grew gradually in Italy during the decade and 
proved to be a peculiar case among other European countries because of its long 
duration, extreme violence and wide diffusion within the social fabric
1
. Political 
violence had two different origins, which scholars tend to place in two different periods, 
essentially splitting the decade in two. Such a distinction could seem conventional, but a 
predominance of right-wing terrorism could be indeed traced during the first half of the 
1970s, starting with the episode of the bomb in Piazza Fontana in Milan in 1969 and 
continuing with the neo-fascist bombing attack in Piazza Della Loggia in Brescia in 
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1974. Fascist violence went down in history as belonging to a precise plan labelled the 
‘strategy of tension’, according to which extreme-right wing movements’ activity was 
accepted and actually supported by the United States, in order to throw the Italian 
situation in turmoil, so that the last would justify an authoritarian turn to the right for the 
sake of domestic security. 
Instead, the ‘red terrorism’ dominated the second-half of the decade, characterizing the 
period to such an extent that those years went down in history as ‘years of lead’, 
referring to the bullets shot during the ambushes by the left-wing extremists. Subversive 
leftist groups considerably increased over the years, counting a myriad of movements, 
among which forty-seven were actually active and operating
2
. 
As regards what was called the red terrorism, the Red Brigades ended up monopolizing 
the whole category. The Marxist-Leninist organization developed a well-organized 
structure  ̶thanks also to the aid of other left-wing subversive groups ̶ conceived in order 
to combine the theory of revolution and its practice. Originally committed to 
demonstrative acts against the Northern fabrics ̶ such as fire destroying the fabric 
equipment or the circulation of subversive leaflets, exalting the armed propaganda ̶ from 
1972 the Red Brigades started their kidnapping activity. At first, their targets were 
business managers of the main Northern cities’ fabrics, but gradually the subversive 
organization started going for representatives of the Italian law, journalists, till they 
succeeded in hitting ‘the heart of the State’ through the kidnapping and murder of the 
Italian Christian Democracy’s President, Aldo Moro. 
This historical event changed the course of the Italian political background. Indeed, on 
the 16
th
 of March 1978, the Parliament had to express its vote of confidence for the 
fourth Andreotti Government, which would boast the direct participation in the majority 
of the Italian Communist Party for the first time since 1947 ̶ a result achieved by the 
close dialogue between Aldo Moro and the Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer. 
Although the Government received a massive vote of confidence both from the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, once the Moro affair was over, the Communists 
started a crisis, which would lead to the fifth Andreotti Government, with the Italian 
Communist Party in opposition, but with the Italian Socialists supporting the executive 
branch. 
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The dramatic event of Moro’s abduction and murder by the Red Brigades showed that 
terrorism in Italy was a real threat. The terrorist organization could kidnap the leading 
representative of a democratic State and detain him for fifty-five days in the capital city, 
avoiding military forces and security services. They could kill him and leave his corpse 
in the boot of a car, parked in the halfway of the headquarters of both the Italian 
Communists and Christina Democrats. 
The aim of this thesis work is to point out the interest of London in the situation of law 
and order in Italy during the whole 1970s. It was tried to reconstruct the British concern 
through the help of diplomatic documents, which are available in the official website 
‘Margaret Thatcher Foundation’
3
, a valuable source offering free access to numerous 
historical documents pertaining to the Thatcher period. Yet, official papers strictly 
related to terrorism date back to after 1978, thus it was possible to reconstruct the 
British point of view from the Moro’s murder on. However, when diplomatic 
documents fail to give back London’s perception of law and order in Italy, British 
newspaper articles come to aid and represent a notable source of information, offering a 
complete image of the attention devoted by the UK for the endurance of the democratic 
order in Italy. 
As regards the diplomatic documents, the assistance of Professor Elena Calandri and the 
scholar Giulia Bentivoglio was fundamental. Scientific essays on Anglo-Italian relations 
during the Cold-War are available only for the period from the end of the 1940s and the 
1950s. The 1970s are not fully investigated, although in this decade, European 
integration gives the two States the opportunity to establish close relations. The Italian 
academic that significantly contributed to explore such a topic is Giulia Bentivoglio, 
whose book ‘The Two Sick Men of Europe’
4
 and essay ‘Violenza endemica o 
eterodiretta? Il terrorismo italiano degli anni Settanta e Ottanta visto da Londra’
5
 were 
two fundamental guides for this thesis work. 
Their similar fate as ‘sick men’ of the European Community is only a part of what Great 
Britain and Italy shared. Actually, once the UK entered the EEC ̶ a process strongly 
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favored by the Italian Government ̶ the two nations came together to work out some 
issues within the Economic Community, which they regarded unfavorable and unfair 
for their countries. 
Hence, the first part of this thesis addresses the international background of both Italy 
and Great Britain during the 1970s. 
The first chapter is aiming at offering the international context in which Italy moved 
during a decade characterized by several and different crises ̶ tensions between Western 
and Arab countries, tense relations between the USA and the European Community 
members. Such account is conceived with the purpose of pointing out that the Italian 
nation had actually a significant role in the international field, despite its precarious 
domestic status. The overview on Italy’s role as global actor outlined in the first chapter 
follows four points:  
 East-West conflict 
 European Integration 
 G7 
 Mediterranean and Middle-East issue 
The second chapter is devised as a mirror-chapter of the first. It is referred to Great 
Britain and its position on the aforementioned questions, in the attempt to highlight the 
connections and differences between the British and the Italian stance on these themes. 
Such analysis’ intent aims at justifying the British interest in the Italian domestic 
situation, and specifically its concern on the situation of law and order. 
The third chapter introduces the second part of this thesis work, which address the 
specific theme of political violence in Italy during the years taken into consideration. 
In the third chapter, an introductive section pertaining to the phenomenon of political 
terrorism examines the different phases, through which it went over the centuries, as 
well as the effort made in order to give to political terrorism an inclusive definition able 
to identify it among the myriad phenomena belonging to the broad category of political 
violence. Then, an overview of political terrorism with left-wing hallmarks in Italy is 
provided. The Red Brigades and their satellite groups’ history is investigated in order to 




Finally, the last chapter aims at showing the British interest in the terrorist phenomenon 
in Italy, pointing out the major issues pertaining to the Italian terrorism arisen from the 





   
              
   




1 Italy in the 1970s 
1.1 Introduction to the 1970s: years of economic, political and cultural 
changes during the early détente and its crisis 
6
 
The 1970s have been years of huge importance for the world since they have 
experienced fundamental changes in every field of the society, from the cultural to the 
political and economic sphere. They witnessed a long period of protests against the 
established power and those virtues that it has conveyed for all the post-World War II’s 
years.  
An anti-West mood gradually spread mainly among young people and took the shape of 
an opposition to USA’s foreign policy, effectively symbolised by the disastrous war in 
Vietnam,   and to the capitalist system, which underwent  two profound crises during 
the decade: the first dated back to the early 1970s, when Nixon needed to finance the 
War in Vietnam and quit the Bretton Woods system in August 1971, ending the 
convertibility of the US dollar to gold; the second shock to the global economy was 
caused by the increase in crude oil prices in 1973-1974, after the Yom Kippur War. A 
further oil shock will happen in the last years of the decade, as a consequence of the 
Iranian Revolution and the War between Iraq and Iran.  
Western people became disenchanted with the capitalistic system, which was thought to 
be on the decline, conversely nations from the Third World found in the Western 
economic system crisis a chance to set them free from the economic subordination 
through their own administration of raw materials, essential to the Western economy. 
Economy was not the only sphere which met a point of no return: politics as well 
experienced some critical times, starting from the Watergate scandal, which hit US 
administration in 1972 and led to Nixon’s resignation in August 1974. The scandal 
brought serious consequences on US foreign policy, causing an isolationism stance of 
the superpower, which seemed to be losing the leadership of the West. 
The effects of American decline in political leadership showed up in Western Europe as 
a change of direction towards the left as far as European governments were concerned: 
West Germany left-wing government dated back to 1969 when the Social-democrat 
Willy Brandt took office as Chancellor. In 1974 he was replaced by the SPD member 
Helmut Schmidt. In 1974 the Labour Party took office in Great Britain with Callaghan 
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as Prime Minister, his government lasted till the end of the 1970s although in a 
precarious situation; in that same year in France, the liberal Valery Giscard d’Estaing 
was elected President of the French Republic. As regards Italy, albeit Communists did 
not reach governmental position, they gained the 34,37% of the votes, almost five 
points less than the Christian Democrats, which gained the 38,71%
7
. 
Moreover, the political sphere was shaken by the fall of the dictatorships in three West 
European countries: the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in April 1974, the restoration 
of the Democracy in Greece in July of the same year and the death of Franco in Spain in 
November 1975. 
While in Europe the dictatorships disappeared, in the Arab world they strengthened 
themselves. It is the case of the government set up through a coup against the King Idris 
of Libya by young military officers headed by Muammar Gaddafi in 1969. The new 
Libyan leader established the Libyan Arab Republic, inspired by Nasserism. A shift to 
the Communism showed up also in Indochina after the Fall of Saigon in 1975, whereas 
not even Africa was spared by a Communist’s wave: Angola and Mozambique were 
ruled by pro-Soviet parties, while Ethiopia was declared a one-party Communist state; 
but also in a variety of African countries “African socialism” was in power. While 
Communists were gaining ground in Western Europe and the USSR projected its power 
worldwide, its control was increasingly resented in the Warsaw Pact countries, even if 
dissent in those countries was violently repressed.  
In a world where both of the super powers were experiencing difficult times, the role of 
Cuba increased more and more; Fidel Castro became the paladin of liberation 
movements and a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1979.  
In Latin America he inspired numerous attempts from left-wing parties and guerrilla 
movements to take power, nevertheless most of them were violently taken over from 
military dictatorship during the mid-1970s.  
Albeit pacifist ideals informed the society during the 1970s, countries as Germany, 
France and Italy were tormented by terrorist actions led by organized groups, aiming at 
destabilizing their national governments. Destabilization was pursued by both right-
wing and left-wing terrorists, but their final goal differed. The former’s strategy was 
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designed to create such an unbearable situation that a military intervention would be 
required in order to restore the public order and justify the establishment of a 
dictatorship in place of a democratic government. Left-wing terrorism, on the other 
hand, sought to involve masses with the purpose of overthrowing capitalist governments 
in favour of a Marxist-Leninist societies, entailing the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Italy represented a peculiar case in this context because of the strong presence of both 
these kinds of terrorism. The terrorist phenomenon had international targets as well: it is 
the case of the Palestinians, who realized multiple international terror attacks to attract 
the attention of the world on the plight of the Palestinians and on their request for a 
state. 
 
1.2 Italy in the East-West conflict: the Italian case 
Italy in the 1970s has been a topic of studies, nonetheless the scholars’ attention has 
focussed mainly on internal policy, economy and cultural history. What has been 
underestimated is its role in the international scenario during the 1970s. Indeed, it has  
often been regarded as a mere object of the international system instead of a subject
8
. 
This chapter wants to offer an overview of Italy’s role as an international actor on the 
global issues during the decades. 
The international role of Italy manifests itself in four different dimensions, that are: 
 Italy in the East-West conflict 
 Italy in European Integration 
 Italy in G7 
 Italy in the Mediterranean and Middle East issues 
Regarding USA position towards Italy, during the Cold War the peninsula has always 
been gaining more importance because of its symbolic value: the Country hosted the 
largest USSR-Backed Communist Party in Western Europe, which seemed to be on the 
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verge of winning the election and ruling the Country by democratic means, representing 
a dangerous precedent for the Southern flank of the Mediterranean
9
. 
The focus on Italy has gradually changed its intensity and nature over those years. The 
major concern of US administrations has always been represented by American 
opposition to Communist threat. In a first phase this struggle coincided with the attempt 
to modernize Italy, setting up an economy and a political system informed by liberal 
spirit, which, according USA, could hinder the Communism spread on the Peninsula
10
. 
Nevertheless, in a second phase, coinciding with the Italian general election in 1976, 
this perspective changed, also because the new US administration led by Jimmy Carter 
intended to promote the new foreign policy model of “non-interference and non-
indifference”. 
On 20-21 June 1976 Italian elections showed a split in the electorate: 14.209.519 voters 
confirmed their support to DC, whereas 12.614.650 Italians
11
 chose to trust Berlinguer’s 
PCI ̶ strong support for the Communist party had already appeared in the local elections 
in 1975year, when the major cities of Torino, Milan, Bologna, Florence, Rome and 
Naples had Communist mayors or Communists in coalition government
12
. The 1976 
election marked a stagnation of the Socialist Party, which gained the same percentage of 
votes of the 1972 general election. 
In 1976 the expected “overtaking” by the PCI on the ruling Christian Democrat party 
did not happen, but the Christian Democrats needed the support of their historical ally, 
the PSI, to form a government. The Psi however was experiencing a period of renewal, 
with the nominee as a Secretary of Bettino Craxi. Under his guidance the PSI chose not 
to take part in the majority, leaving the weakened DC unable to form a government. 
Indeed, the outcome of this election was a substantial draw between the two blocs: the 
left one consisting of the Italian Communist Party, the Italian Socialist Party and other 
few parties obtained almost the 45% of the votes. Since the electoral system was a pure 
party-list proportional representation, the lack of a clear majority arose the problem of 
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the making up of the government. To carry out this purpose, the DC had to turn to the 
PCI, which guaranteed the abstention for the survival of the government
13
.  
Andreotti’s third cabinet, which lasted until 1978, was called the government of the 
“not-no confidence”, since it governed thanks to the external support of all the political 
parties in the Parliament, except the Italian Social Movement, a neo-fascist party, the 
Proletarian Democracy, a far-left party, and the Radical Party. 
That was a “unicolour” government, since the executive consisted of Christian 
Democrats, but the main institutional charges were distributed among the parties 
according to the votes they gained, even to Communists: Pietro Ingrao, a Communist 
deputy, was elected as President of the Chamber of Deputies. As regards the Prime 
Minister, Andreotti was elected at suggestion of Moro, who believed he could reassure 
the allied countries as far as Communist threat was concerned
14
. 
The Communist scare in Italy dates back to the origin of the Cold War, but as years 
passed it was misunderstood more and more by the allied countries: they were too much 
concerned in avoiding a Communist takeover to focus their attention on the peculiarity 
of the Italian case. In the aftermath of the Italian local elections in 1975, the morning of 
the last day of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 
Helsinki, a meeting between the American and Italian highest offices, Ford and Moro, 
together with Kissinger (American Secretary of State) and Rumor (Italian Foreign 
Minister) took place. During this talk (which actually was a not-so-subtle 
confrontation), American President Ford expressed his concern about Communist 
presence in Italy, especially with regards to the Portuguese situation. In Moro’s turn, he 
tried to make clear the nature of Italian Communist Party and Italian Communist voters. 
What mattered to Moro was make the American President aware of the PCI’s distinctive 
essence: its moderate change, its appeal to all social classes and its autonomy from the 
Soviet Communist Party
15
. Moreover the Italian Prime Minister stressed how Christian 
Democrats did not undervalue their opponent and in spite of their moderate claims, DC 
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did not believe in PCI’s affirmative stance to NATO
16
. Then Moro underscored how 
difficult it was to refuse any political contact with the Communists, while US 
administration had constant meetings with the Soviet. Ford reply was bitterly harsh: 
“[…]The two position are incompatible. This is détente and if I meet Brezhnev it 
doesn’t mean I elect him vice president. I can’t understand how someone can’t 
distinguish an apple from an orange”
17
. 
Rumor endeavoured to moderate the talk and asked for a recognition of the international 
role of Italy, persisting in demanding a permanent invitation of Italy in the four powers’ 
summits
18
.   
The Communist issue is interpreted by the US administration through a standpoint 
taking into account the crisis DC was undergoing: a Memorandum by the CIA titled 
“Italy: the political-economic scene in early 1976”
19
 contained a whole paragraph 
dealing with the internal conflict the Christian Democracy was going through. The party 
was split into two branches represented by Benigno Zaccagnini (elected as National 
Secretary of the Christian Democracy with a few votes gap) and Arnaldo Forlani, 
Minister of Defence. The two representatives embodied divergent stance of looking at 
the PCI: according to Zaccagnini, DC had to negotiate with Italian Communists as far as 
practical issues were concerned; on the other hand Forlani put forward ideological 
preconditions, which couldn’t be overtaken
20
. Albeit Zaccagnini’s position proved to be 
the winning one at the 13
th
 party congress in 1976, his wing would have always had to 
confront the branch refusing any dialogues with the PCI. 
Only few days after the Italian general election, a meeting between some Italian-
American Associations and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs (NSA) taking place in the White House revealed a contradictory management of 
the Italian situation: while they declared a no-interference positon in Italian domestic 
policy, on the other hand they claimed that a government with a Communist 
participation would contrast with NATO’s principles
21
. 
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The Communist issue was the topic of a conference between the USA and the three 
major European countries in occasion of the Puerto Rico Summit, which was held in 
June 27 and 28 1976, on the initiative of the US administration.  
Out of concern about the crisis the V Moro’s Cabinet was undergoing in early 1976, 
mainly due to the lack of support by PSI, Kissinger wrote a letter to the two leading 
exponents of the Socialists in Europe: Willy Brandt, the president of the Socialist 
International, and Harold Wilson, at that time Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. 
The US Secretary of State affirmed that interactions with Communists were conceivable 
only under the NATO shield and only with the Soviets. He included in the letter to 
Wilson a comment on the Italian case, since he was worried that the Italian Socialist 
Party would not support the Christian Democracy anymore
22
. Kissinger’s main concern 
was the possibility that PCI could absorb the whole left, thus he asked Wilson to 
endeavour to influence in some way PSI
23
.  
The original input to the organization of the meeting was given as an answer to Ford, 
who had been worried by an alarming report on Italian economic situation by the 
economist Alan Greenspan. The latter suggested to gather a meeting, even if they had 
no idea of how Western Countries could help Italy. The purpose was to influence, if not 
the election at least the making of the government
24
. After preliminary meetings not 
always characterized by mutual consent, the Puerto Rico summit was set up: its official 
schedule included the global economic scene and North-South issues; Italian debt and 
eventual economic aids were on a side programme, which the parts chose to discuss in a 
preliminary meeting on the first day morning
25
. 
 USA, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Deutschland and France proposed not only 
the exclusion of the Communists from government but also economic measures, aimed 
at a change in tackling the major structural problems of Italian economy and society: 
deficit spending, social inequalities, tax evasion, increasing criminal acts
26
.  
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1.3 Italy in European Integration 
When it comes to European Integration in the 1970s, traditional historiography 
considered the decade as a lost period, pointing to some crucial causes: the failure of the 
“snake in the tunnel”, that is the attempt to limit fluctuations between the different 
European currencies; the decay of USA started from the Watergate scandal, the 
economic crisis following the Yom Kippur war and later the crisis of détente
27
. More 
recent historiography sees the 1970s as decisive years in Europe, exactly for the reasons 
that pushed the main European countries to react.  
The launch of a European monetary policy, which saw as its greatest achievement the 
entering into force of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 as a natural 
development of the “snake in the tunnel”, was one of the steps European Community 
made towards the aim of complete integration. A further development in this direction 
was the formalisation in 1974 of the European Council, a body of the heads of State or 
government of the European Community member states. First appeared in 1961, gained 
an official shape in 1974 but was legally recognized only with the Treaty on European 
Union in 1992
28
. The European Council in 20 September 1976 scheduled the direct 
election of the European Parliament through the universal suffrage
29
, making a forward 
step towards a reduction of the ‘democratic gap’.  
During the 1970s, EC enlarged by accepting Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom in 
1973; moreover, the crisis in the Mediterranean flank, with the fall of the great colonels, 
Salazar’s dictatorship in Portugal and the death of Franco in Spain, represented a chance 
for European Community to broaden its borders
30
.  
As a consequence of the entrance of the United Kingdom in the European Community, 
the Lomé Convention was signed, an agreement regarding trade and aid between 
European Economic Community and seventy-one African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Countries. 
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A further success was an enlargement of the Community competences through the 
establishment of the European Social Fund (ESF) and of the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERF) in 1975. 
As far as Italian position is concerned, historians used to hold the peninsula more as a 
mere object of European policies than as an active actor of the integration process. 
Nevertheless, academics have recently proposed a different perspective, recognizing 
three distinct phases of Italian activity in European context
31
: in the first period, from 
1969 to 1973, Italy was an active supporter of the enlargement process especially with 
regards to United Kingdom, seen as a valuable counterweight to the power of the 
German Federal Republic and France. 
Other Communitarian issues appeared to be problematic for Italy. First of all the 
introduction of the Value added tax (VAT) approved in 1970, aiming at harmonizing 
the tax system in order to finance the European communitarian budget. Italian 
governments delayed its introduction both for political reasons and for the inefficiency 
of the Public administration. Moreover, serious difficulties were caused by the report 
drafted by a group of experts led by Pierre Werner about the irreversible fixing of the 
rate exchange and the introduction of a single currency within ten years. Italy welcomed 
the economic and monetary union, albeit there were not few detriments for the Italian 
State. Italy feared that a monetary union could lead to capital flows to more developed 
countries inside the Community, increasing regional gaps. In regards to the tax 
harmonization system, Italy feared the possible increment of fiscal pressure. And the 
Bank of Italy opposed the irreversibly fixed exchange rate regime and was willing to 




Besides, differing points of view between the Community and Rome depended on social 
and political reasons. For instance, it was an essential matter for the nation finding a 
solution for the Mezzogiorno, which was thought to be a charge to be taken by the 
whole Community. For this purpose, Italy assumed a main role in the promotion of the 
first tripartite Conference, in which Ministers of Labour from the six State members and 
representatives of the Commission and of the major trade unions met in order to discuss 
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social reforms in the European context
33
. Donat-Cattin denounced the lack of 
Communitary social policies and he sided with trade unions’ proposal of employment 
policies to be promoted within EEC
34
. The Tripartite Conference and the role played by 
Italy bolstered the creation of a permanent Employment Committee and a reform of the 
European Social Fund. 
Thus, Italy was insisting on a wake-up call that could make European Community 
shoulder the fundamental mission of being the supporter of regional policies; 
nonetheless, not all the State Members held this matter as essential for the Community 
in those years. Indeed, actions towards this direction were taken only since 1973, when 
the Great Britain’s entrance in the European Community made that regional policies 
were taken seriously into consideration. 
In the two-year period going from 1972 to 1973, Italian role in the Community faltered: 
albeit the Nation adopted the “snake in the tunnel” system, it quit it only a year after its 
stipulation (following Great Britain and Ireland). The following two-year period was a 
difficult time for the Country, mainly because of the energy ̶ due to the Yom Kippur 
war ̶ and the political crises, which led to violent social unrests.  
Following the energy crisis the EEC, proved to be a weak entity, especially in face of 
economic problems, which were often discussed in private meetings between the four 
major western countries (USA, UK, German Federal Republic and France), excluding 
Italy even when it was concerned. 
Nonetheless, if the interest in the European integration process seemed to weaken 
among other State members, it played a fundamental function within Italian domestic 
policy. Indeed, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) exploited integration for ready to take 
part to governmental decisions. Its position moved from a blunt rejection of Italy’s 
membership in the EEC, accused to be only an instrument of US foreign policy, to a 
sincere commitment to the Community, which was now regarded as an institution where 
improvement should be promoted in favour of the working class
35
. PCI’s choice 
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towards a pro-European stance was made clear in 1979, when the Italian Communist 
Party welcomed Altiero Spinelli as a candidate to the first European direct election.  
Italian participation to the European Community’s activities was held as fundamental 
also by other Italian parties; among them, the Italian Republican Party (PRI), whose 
Secretary Ugo La Malfa firmly believed that European integration and austerity 
measures could represent the solution to the economic crisis affecting the peninsula; 
nonetheless, such a measure needed the support of both the PCI and the trade unions, 
since the so called “politica dei redditi” was possible only with their support
36
.  
1.3.1 The European Monetary System (EM): Italy’s position 
A further paramount aspect of the European integration process was the establishment 
of the European monetary system (EMS) in 1979, regarded the first significant step 
towards the European economic and monetary union
37
. The idea of EMS came up to 
West-German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt as an answer to USA’s pressure on West 
Germany to take on the role of “locomotive” of the European recovery process. The 
German Chancellor aimed at creating a monetary stability zone in Europe, as the one 
guaranteed in the 1950s and 1960s by the Bretton Woods system; indeed, he devised a 
system similar to Bretton Woods: the European monetary stability zone would have a 
European Monetary Fund (EMF) comparable to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
whose funds were provided by all member States
38
. Schmidt advanced his proposal 
during the meeting of the European Council at Copenhagen in April 1978; he chose to 
discuss this subject in intergovernmental negotiations that he expected to be more 
favourably and productive
39
. The preparatory steps were managed secretly by a 
committee appointed by the leaders of West-Germany, Great Britain and France. Italy 
was not involved in the preliminary phase of the project; despite the irritation, the 
Italian Prime Minister Andreotti had to agree, but tried to impose conditions: during the 
EEC meeting in Bremen, Andreotti asked for some measures aimed at aiding 
disadvantaged nations
40
. Nevertheless, EMS negotiations coincided with a gloomy 
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period for Italy, because of DC’s secretary Aldo Moro’s kidnapping and murder, which 
made the country fall into chaos and forced the PCI to vote for the new government 
established on 16 March 1978, the very same day of the BR’s attack to Christian 
Democracy’s President.  
Andreotti had to take into account diverging stances among and inside the parties and 
other institutions, as Bankitalia. Eurosceptic members of the PCI and PSI strongly 
opposed the EMS, since it was believed to strengthen the German-French leading role 
in the EEC and to represent a detriment for weaker social classes; regarding the Italian 
Central Bank, the Governor believed that Italian economy was still too weak; moreover, 
he feared that EMS, as it was conceived, could have forced Bankitalia to submit its 
power to the new system
41
. Furthermore, the Government’s attitude was influenced by 
the drafting of the three-year plan by the then Minister of Finance Filippo Maria 
Pandolfi, who confirmed that EMS was possible only if it involved policies on three 
fields of action, i.e. the exchange rate mechanism, the European Monetary Fund and 
measures in favour of weak economies
42
. 
Although over the negotiations the lira was allowed wider exchange rate margin, the 
Italian government took time to mull over the adhesion. Andreotti feared the loss of 
PCI’s support, which was essential for the government’s survival. This was the reason 
that brought Italy not to adhere to the EMS at the European Council meeting in early 
December 1978; it did it few days later. Italy accepted to join the European Monetary 
System thanks to the votes of DC, the Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI), the 
Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Italian Social 
Movement (MSI); the PSI abstained and, most important, the PCI voted against the 
system, placing itself again in the opposition
43
. A capital role in changing the 
government’s position was played by the President of PRI, Ugo La Malfa, who in an 
interview published on 7
th
 December in the Italian newspaper “Corriere della Sera” 
made adhesion to the European monetary system a condition for the continuation of his 
party’s support to the government
44
. In the same day (only two days after the decisive 
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meeting in Bruxelles) La Malfa wrote an article on “La Voce Repubblicana”, and 
dismissed to the Italian objections to EMS, which, he thought, was unjustifiably 
influenced by Great Britain’s stance
45
. In the article, the PRI President stressed the 
numerous differences existing between the Peninsula and the English Island, pointing 
out both British widespread hostility to European integration and the rigorous economic 
policy Great Britain had led
46
. The Italian government, that was refusing  the Pandolfi’s 
plan, jeopardized the economic recovery of the country. Not joining the EMS would 
have made Italy run the risk of international isolation
47
.  
Despite resistances, EMS entered into force on 13 March 1979; Italy and Ireland (whose 
will was to refuse the agreement, siding with Great Britain) joined the initial six 
countries: Germany, France, Denmark and the Benelux. 
Beyond the economic consequences, Italy’s participation to the European Monetary 
System was meaningful for many reasons: it strengthened the bond that linked Italy to 
the West-Europe system in a context characterised by the gradual end of the détente, 
materialized with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979; in the domestic 
field, it meant the end of the government of ‘national unity’, and the Italian Communist 
Party went back the opposition rank. It was the beginning of the gradual PCI isolation, 
which would have lasted till the end of the 1980s. 
1.3.2 Towards the universal suffrage of the European Parliament: the Italian stance 
Integration was pursued in the institutional field, as well. The EC meeting held in Paris 
in 1974 represented the starting point for the path towards a direct election of the 
European Parliament. It has been noticed that this decision actually did not mean a step 
towards a federalist realization of the European Community ̶ that same day the 
formalization of the European Council, a confederal body, was approved ̶ rather an 
attempt to involve parties in the decision making process regarding the European 
Integration
48
. For this purpose, groups of European political parties were conceived, 
having common political platforms. In the period between 1974 and 1976 three groups 
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were set up: the Confederation of Socialist parties of the European Community
49
, the 
Federation of Liberal and Democrat Parties in Europe
50




The direct election of the European Parliament represented a pivotal moment for 
Europe, since it gave European people the opportunity to choose Members of 
Parliament with representativeness and make them truly representative of people’s 
opinion; more important, this representativeness regarded international relations, a 
matter that used to be a prerogative of diplomats and military officers
52
.  
Regarding this subject, Italian position has always been coherent over the years, 
showing a support of the European Integration to be realized according to federalist 
principles. Since the early 1970s, Italian government understood  that a solution for the 
domestic crisis could be sought in a European context, which however had to be 
renewed. Italian interest in a more democratic Community was already clear in 1969, 
when the Italian/English governments agreed on a declaration stating the importance of 
economic and political integrations walking at the same pace, together with the need of 
a directly elected Parliament
53
. Nevertheless, this declaration had no actual effects and 
five more years passed for an effective step forward. During the meeting, Italy proved a 
firm commitment to remove any obstacles that impeded to reach this achievement. 
Italian pledge to elect the European Parliament by universal suffrage continued  in the 




 December 1975, it was finally reached 
a decision to fix the elections in May and June 1979, overcoming English and Danish 
resistance
54




 July in Brussels 
the number of chairs was decided: Italy gained the same number of France, Great 
Britain and West Germany
55
. In this instance, Andreotti expressed satisfaction, 
regarding a decision able to fulfil both the proportionality principle and the 
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. After the approval of the Council of the Brussels Act on 20
th
 




. The quick ratification together 
with a high turnout
58
 at the elections in June 1979 were the expression of a desire to 
participate. 
1.4 The G7: its beginning and Italian efforts to be part of the members 
The 1970s were years of struggle for Italy, since its role within the international arena 
had constantly to be negotiated. The economic negotiations were the most difficult field 
in which the Peninsula had to rise its voice, particularly because of the difficult period 
the European Community, together with the Western World, was going through.  
The urge for common economic decisions was felt by the French President Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing, who promoted a meeting to be held between the four major Western 
countries upon economic issues. The main subject the French President wanted to 
discuss was the restoration of the fixed exchange rates, that is the Bretton Woods 
system. Nevertheless, US administration did not support the French suggestion, 
considered to be an interference in US domestic policies
59
. This notwithstanding, France 
and West-Germany kept insisting on a joint action to tackle the economic problems the 
West was going through. Helmut Schmidt finally found a reason that raised the interests 
of the US administration: in a meeting held in Bonn at the end of July 1975 between the 
German Chancellor and the American President joined by Kissinger, the first stressed 
the consequences that a lack of common decisions would have had for the democratic 
order. He referred also to Italy that: “The political effects of the recession—really a 
depression—threaten political stability in several countries—Italy, where the Christian 
Democrats may accept the Communists in government”
60
. 
At the end, these political reasons stroke a chord in the US administration, whose actual 
concern regarded more economic matters than the safeguard of the democratic system; 
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indeed the USA was worried to be isolated, due to the negotiations Europe was 
conducting with the countries of the Third World, e.g. the Lomé Convention and the 
Great Britain trade deals was undertaking on raw materials within the Commonwealth
61
. 
On that occasion, Schmidt expressed not only concern for Italy, but also the will to have 
the latter among the countries participating to the meeting
62
. On the contrary, France’s 
opinion was to involve the five major powers, whose finance ministers belonged to the 
so-called Library Group, that is USA, Great Britain, France, West-Germany and Japan. 
Thus, Italy’s participation to the economic summit had not to be taken for granted, since 
the Italian situation was the worst among Western industrialized powers because of 
combined factors, e.g. instability in both political and monetary fields, terrorism and the 
rising unemployment index
63
. In spite of its weak position in the economic area, Italy 
pressured France showing its disappointment for not having been involved in the 
quadripartite meeting, expected for the end of July in Helsinki. In that difficult time, 
according to Foreign Minister Rumor, being excluded from decisional summits would 
have damaged Italy’s reputation, causing serious domestic and international 
consequences. Italian government held Italy’s participation in the economic cooperation 
between Western countries to be of fundamental importance, Prime Minister Moro and 
Foreign Minister Rumor sent Raimondo Manzini, the secretary general of the Italian 
Foreign Ministry, making allied countries aware of the consequences an exclusion of 
Italy would bring on the legitimacy of Moro’s government
64
. Manzini led secret talks in 
USA, Great Britain and France, making useful personal friendships: in the end he 
succeeded in gaining the decisive support of the English Foreign Secretary Callaghan, 
who convinced Kissinger to support the Italian cause
65
. Finally, thanks to Manzini’s 
diplomatic work, Italy gained its admission to the Rambouillet summit. This success 
was of pivotal importance since it guaranteed to the Peninsula the membership in the 
top group, which it certainly could not have belonged to, if its participation would have 
come later 
66
. What finally convinced the French President and the other four heads of 
State and government was not the economic significance of Italy, but the political 
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situation that become obvious after the local elections of the 15
th
 June 1975, which 
showed an alarming victory of the PCI in many major Italian cities
67
.  
Italy had not only to fight for its presence to the monetary summit but also to define the 
nature of it, since it was tried to link Italian participation with the rotating presidency of 
the EEC Council, which the country would have been in charge starting from the second 
semester of 1975
68
. This meant running the risk of not being invited to the following 
meetings, that’s the reason that brought Italian diplomacy to abandon the initial attempt 
to promote Italian participation taking advantage of its leading role in the EEC Council. 
As already mentioned, Great Britain played a critical role for the positive outcome of 
the controversy, supporting Italian participation—as a country and not as the President 
of the Council—to the preparatory meeting to be held in New York in October, as well 
as to the monetary summit of Rambouillet. This change of mind from Great Britain was 
interpreted by French diplomacy as an attempt to widen the agenda. Indeed, because of 
their competence in finance and economics, Giscard and Schmidt would have probably 
monopolized the conference: opening up to Italy, would have meant expand the subject 
also to economic and commercial issues
69
. In the end, because of pressures exerted from 
the US and British administrations, Giscard allowed Italy to be part of the group. The 
summit finally took place in the castle of Rambouillet on 15-17 November 1975 and 
involved the President of the French Republic Giscard d’Estaing, the US President 
Ford, the British Prime Minister Wilson, the Italian Prime Minister Moro, the West-
German Chancellor Schmidt and the Prime Minister of Japan Takeo Miki. In his speech, 
President Moro pointed out some solutions which, he thought, could tackle the 
recession problem: an opening of the markets that should be reached by avoiding 
restrictive trade policies, a liberalisation of agricultural products, a fairer trade of 
industrial goods
70
. Furthermore, he expressed his opinion on the East-West issues, 
declaring that economic relations should be build according to the détente background
71
. 
As far as monetary stability was concerned, he claimed his agreement with the French 
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point of view regarding the need of a more stable monetary system, but he explained 
that in those difficult times for Italy, the country required more flexibility
72
.  
Albeit the six did not succeed in setting up a common action to face the international 
economic crisis ̶ on this purpose, the main success was the agreement between USA and 
France, regarding the responsibility of the central banks on preventing anomalous 
fluctuations in exchange rates
73
 ̶ the Rambouillet summit represented the outset of a 
phase characterised by a willingness to undertake concerted actions in economic 
matters
74
. Indeed, the next meeting among the major industrialized countries was 
organized a year later under USA’s boost, this time with the involvement of Canada, 
which had been excluded in 1975 by Giscard. Like in Rambouillet, Italy was an issue at 
the Puerto Rico summit, mainly due to the economic crisis Italy was going through 
because of the depreciation of the lira ̶ which shared this faith with the British pound  ̶ 
and the lack of capitals provided to the country by privates in the international economic 
market
75
. What triggered the wake-up call for the President Ford was a document on the 
Italian economic situation drafted by the economist and Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers, Alan Greenspan
76
. The main three Western Country ̶ France, West 
Germany and Great Britain ̶  did not welcome the proposal enthusiastically: the French 
did not agree on American will to widen the agenda of the meeting to take into account 
political issues. Callaghan feared repercussions on Great Britain, in case the summit 
discussed economic concerns
77
. West Germany, on the contrary, seemed to be 
favourable to a meeting that could prove Western countries had taken the right path on 
economic matters
78
, but made Italian participation dependence on the result of Italian 
elections: in case of a Communist defeat, West Germany pushed for a loan granted by 
IMF instead of EEC
79
. Economic arguments were, thus, strictly linked to political 
considerations. Indeed, according to the English authorities the meeting was actually an 
American attempt to prove the Ford government’s leadership in view of the impending 
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. Moreover, aid to Italy seemed to be available by the Four only if 
a participation of the Communists in government was excluded
81
. 
After the Christian Democrats won the elections with only a little advance on the 
Communist Party, the primary aim became to avoid Communists presence in a coalition 
government. In the preliminary meeting held in the morning of 27
th
 June in Puerto Rico, 
USA, France, West Germany and Great Britain discussed about actions to be 
undertaken. France strongly opposed a Communist participation in the government and 
suggested to link any aid to the acceptance from Italy of an economic plan conceived 
and agreed by the Four in a further meeting to be held on 8
th
 July in Paris
82
. Giscard was 
seeking to avoid an IMF loan unless strict conditions were imposed to Italian economic 
policy. The French President believed this could represent a dangerous precedent for 
developing countries and German chancellor agreed, reaffirming the need of conditions 
to help Italian government approve severe policy before its Parliament and public 
opinion
83
. As a French ambassador predicted, in the aftermath of Puerto Rico what 
actually happened was a paradox: the imposition from  the “Big Four” of severe 
conditions on Italian economic policy made impossible to Andreotti government to 
resort to PCI participation
84
, since the involvement of social parts was requested.  
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1.5 The Middle East issue in the Italian Foreign Policy: a failed attempt to 
lead an independent action towards Arabic regions 
The Mediterranean together with the Middle East region represented a critical topic for 
the European continent ̶ and more generally for the West. Its significance traced back to 
both security and economical observations: the first were linked to the vicinity of these 
lands, so that disorder in those areas would have meant a direct involvement of Europe, 
whereas the latter were due to the role those lands had as far as supply of crude oil was 
concerned
85
. Intervention in these territories were not regulated by a common 
international ̶ or even only European ̶ policy, so that individual ̶ at times even opposing ̶ 
mediations were led. As far as Italian action was concerned, a conflicting stance 
characterized the Mediterranean policy of the Peninsula
86
. 
In the early 1970s, Italian efforts to carry an effective Mediterranean policy were made 
clear by the numerous relations the current Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, 
Aldo Moro, established in the North of the African continent as well as in some regions 
of the Middle East. Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt on the African side, Turkey, 
Israel and Iran on the Middle East front were the countries with whom Italy was leading 
diplomatic affairs. From this talks, it started to take shape the idea of a conference 
similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which would 
have had as aim the peacekeeping and the economic-social development of these 
areas
87
. Italian concern on this topic found a reason on its will to compensate for Italy’s 
lack of effective influence as far as the international field was concerned; in addition, it 
mirrored a hidden strategy, which consisted in creating friendly relations with those 
countries beyond the Mediterranean sea
88
. Moreover, it must be taken into account the 
Western countries’ dependence on the petrol from those regions. 
Moro’s efforts were directed to create an Arab-Italian cooperation through diplomatic 
and business relations mainly with five nations of that area
89
: 
 the Egypt of Al-Sadat, which was a pivotal partner thanks to its contacts with 
both Arabs and Israel;  
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 the Iraq of Hasan Al-Bakr, whose strategic importance came from its petrol;  
 Algeria, with whom Italy was leading negotiations about the building of the 
Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline, which was meant to supply Italy with alternative 
energy;  
 Libya, which represented an extremely difficult partner as soon as Gaddafi 
seized power in a coup; indeed, a year later, in 1970, he ordered the 




 Saudi Arabia, whose relevance derived from its crude oil and its relationships 
with USA. 
Nevertheless, the establishment of a cooperation between the two worlds in those years 
meant a firm stance regarding the Palestinian issue, to which the previously mentioned 
countries were committed. Placing oneself on the side of the Arabs meant embracing the 
Palestinian cause, on the contrary supporting Israel would have implied the risk of a 
penalisation concerning the petrol supplies. In this respect, the measures Arabic 
countries took in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War are significant. After an initial 
sever cut on petrol exportations, during the Algiers Summit Conference held in 
November 1973, its members made a list of friend and enemy countries, which was 
meant to give guidelines about the different supplies of petrol addressed to those nations 
according their support or opposition to the fulfilment of the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 242
91
. Italy was unexpectedly excluded from both categories, 
despite its efforts to accomplish OPEC’s requests during that year, in order to gain some 
profits in the petrol supplies
92
.  
Albeit Italian parties showed divergent opinions regarding position Italy had to adopt in 
the aftermath of the Kippur War ̶ Christian Democrats were still on their “equidistance” 
opinion, whereas the Socialist and the Republican party shared a prevalent pro-Israeli 
stance, on the other hand Communists were on the Palestinian side
93
 ̶  the government 
kept on asking for the withdraw of Israel and the recognition of Palestinian rights 
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according to the Resolution 242
94
. Evident sings of Italy siding with Palestinian cause 
were its refusal to grant USA NATO bases placed in Italy during the Kippur War and its 
approval for Arafat’s taking part to the debate on the Palestinian issue promoted on the 





Nonetheless, these expressions of support were contradicted by an ambiguous behaviour 
exemplified by Italian abstention during the vote held in the General Assembly 
regarding the status of Palestinian people, together with the improvement of both Arab 
and American relationships, both of them aiming at developing an energy policy
96
. Such 
a stance of the country was symptomatic of the lack of direction Italian policy on 
Mediterranean and Middle-East regions suffered from; a policy, which was actually an 
array of attempt mainly ̶ if not exclusively ̶ based on an economic logic.  
Between 1973 and 1974, a slight progress on the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
was made: agreements involving Israel with the Arabic countries of Egypt and Syria 
were concluded under the supervision of USA; again, it was the decisive action of 
United States that provided a solution to the conflict through bilateral negotiations, 
while the European Community proved to be disorganized
97
. Aware of their weakness, 
the European members endeavoured to promote a community policy on the 
Mediterranean that could be independent from USA but not necessarily contrasting. 
This attempt corresponded to the promotion of the Euro-Arab dialogue, whose first 
meeting took place on 31
th
 July 1974, between representatives of both the European 
Community and the Arab League, i.e. the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean 
Sauvagnargues, who was also the President of the European Council, together with the 
President of the European Commission Ortoli on one hand, and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Kuwait and President of Arabic League Sheikh Sabah Al-Jaber and its 
General Secretary Mahmoud Riad  on the other
98
. In this context they discussed the 
overall structure the cooperation work had to take, devising firstly a permanent General 
Commission consisting of representatives of the twenty-nine governments involved, 
then a commission that was in charge of evaluating sectors where the cooperation 
between the two parts could be realized, and finally a ministerial conference that had to 
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 Italy displayed its enthusiasm for the inaugural meeting through Moro’s words, by 
which an optimistic stance towards this first step can be noticed:  
la naturale complementarietà e continuità del mondo europeo e del mondo arabo [che avrebbe potuto 
portare a] un’ampia ed organica collaborazione in una prospettiva evolutiva di lungo periodo 




Unfortunately, the Euro-Arab dialogue did not get the expected results. The reason was 
mainly due to the involvement of the Palestinian issue in every negotiation, betraying 
Arabs’ will to associate the dialogue with political contents, opposing to the European 
intention of coming to agreements involving only economic and cultural spheres
101
. 
Indeed, both of the parts appeared to be averse to step back from their positions: Arabic 
countries insisted on demanding the official recognition of PLO as the legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians together with a stronger bargaining power than Israel; 




Although communitarian policies on the relationship with the Middle-East were 
pursued, bilateral agreements kept being favoured among the member States
103
. 
Diplomatic relations with Egypt played a central role from the mid-1970s, since the 
country opened to negotiations with Israel and together was the reference nation among 
Arabic regions. During a visit to Cairo of the Italian President Leone both of the parties 
stressed the importance of the Palestinian cause, although both of them agreed on not 
denying Israel’s worthiness of existence. Egypt was strongly committed to hold a 
peaceful dialogue with Israel. On 1
th
 September 1975, Egypt and Israel signed an 
agreement according to which the latter had to further withdraw from the region of 
Sinai; moreover, conforming to it, not-military ships were allowed to cross the Suez 
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. In April of the same year the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Rumor, 
during a visit to Sadat, expressed his approval of the renewed negotiations between 
Egypt and Israel on devising a solution for the conflict. Furthermore, he promoted the 
European involvement as a guarantor in the diplomacy between the countries. 
Nonetheless, the Italian initiative on Europe’s behalf weakened the following year. In 
1976 the Egyptian President Sadat, during a visit aiming at establishing new alliances ̶  
replacing the Soviet one, lost because of the Egyptian approach to USA and Israel
105
 ̶ 
asked the Italian government for being a moderator among severe European countries, 
i.e. Netherlands and Denmark. Italy made only vague declarations. A turning point 
happened as soon as Jimmy Carter became President of the USA: the dialogue between 
the two involved parts yielded significant advancement thanks to the resolute new 
President’s commitment to the cause of the human rights
106
. Steps forward were moved 
towards a recognition of Palestinian people’s rights and the identification of a 
homeland. To this purpose, according to the US administration, Palestinian 
representatives should take part to the negotiations taking place in Geneva. In 
November 1977, an unexpected visit by the Egyptian President Sadat to the city of 
Jerusalem shocked the entire world. Italy payed close attention to the event and among 
parties positive feedbacks were provided: they emphasized the importance of Sadat’s 
gesture, which challenged both Israel and Arabic countries to make efforts free from 
prejudices and resentment
107
. In the course of that year, thanks to the stabilisation of the 
oil market, Italy could afford to lead its foreign policy in the Arabic countries from a 
more political view
108
. Nonetheless, its actions were bounded by the activity of the 
USA, which were leading the negotiations. Although Italy always tried to be on the 
front line at fostering concerted efforts as far as Middle-East was concerned, other 




Moreover, every attempt of concerted actions by European countries was firmly 
stigmatised by the US administration, which regarded them as an attack to the Atlantic 
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block and an opportunity for Arab countries to foster their idea of the establishment of 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO)
110
. Also Italian autonomous actions 
were criticized by US authorities: Moro was perceived as the advocate of this kind of 
policy, which was pursued also thanks to agreements reached by ENI (Ente Nazionale 
Idrocarburi, National Hydrocarbons Authority); nonetheless, his project involved also 
multilateral accords to be sought in the context of a Communitarian strategy, exploiting 
the favourable period of détente
111
. Although Andreotti was preferred as interlocutor by 
the US administration, he was not spared by Kissinger’s criticism, which provided the 
litmus test of the US contempt towards Italian politicians: « Andreotti could not restrain 
himself from expressing the perennial illusion that Italy could contribute by reasons of 
propinquity to the solution of the Middle East problem. But while every Italian leader I 
met advanced this proposition, none acted as if he believed in it»
112
. 
As every Italian actions on the foreign context in this decade, Italian Mediterranean 
policy was undermined by internal pressures starting from 1976, which was the famous 
year of the “Historic Compromise”: Washington’s influence became more persistent, so 
that every move was weighed according USA’s will and, more generally, according to 
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2 Great Britain in the 1970s 
In this chapter Great Britain’s international role is analyzed with references to its 
position in the East-West conflict, its membership in the European Economic 
Community and the controversial Middle-Eastern issue. 
The analysis follows the same path of the first chapter regarding Italy; hence, the 
attempt to highlight here, as far as possible, the connections and differences between the 
British and Italian stance on these themes. Their objectives not always coincided, but on 
some occasions they adopted a common strategy in specific issues, for instance in 
supporting the development of a European Regional Policy within the EEC. 
Their closeness within the EEC did not stem from a shared ideal of what the 
Community represented for them ̶ the widening of its market for Britain, a supranational 
organism able to overcome domestic political and social divisions within the country, as 
Italy ̶ but on the goal of banding together to balance the influential Franco-German axis. 
Furthermore, an interesting parallel between the two countries could be found in their 
domestic background: this decade saw both of them experiencing a severe economic 
crisis together with social turmoil. 
As for Great Britain, the social conflict in the industrial areas went at the same pace of 
economic decline: strikes became commonplace and trade unions acquired increasing 
power. Their membership hugely increased during these years reaching a record 
13,498,000 in 1979
114
. The troubles worried both the Conservative government of 
Edward Heath, in power until 1974 ̶ with the two national coal miners’ strikes in 1972 
and 1974, the latter resulting in a national state emergency and a call for general 
elections ̶ and the Labour governments of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan. Under 
the latter a series of industrial disputes erupted, resulting in never-ending strikes that 
threw the country in disarray from the end of 1978 till the beginning of 1979. Because 
of the continuing protests, this period was remembered as ‘the winter of discontent’. 
Significantly, 22 January 1979 went down in history as the worst day of those weeks, in 
which 1.5 million public sector employees did not go to work
115
. 
The ‘winter of discontent’ was the climax of an unstable situation that had been 
gradually worsening for years. Hence, it is understandable that in some areas of its 
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foreign policy, Britain suffered a lack of trust especially as far as its relations with the 
United States were concerned.         
2.1 Great Britain in the East-West conflict: highs and lows of a ‘special 
relationship’ 
It was pointed out in the first chapter that the East-West conflict resulted in an incessant 
interference in Italian politics exerted by the Americans. In the following paragraphs it 
will be clear that Washington’s influence played a significant role also in the making of 
British foreign policy, regarding both its EEC membership and its strategy for the 
Middle-East region. 
Britain’s position during the Cold War could be roughly summed up by the expression 
‘special relationship’, first used by Winston Churchill during the memorable ‘Iron 
curtain’ speech held in Fulton on 4 March 1946
116
, as a description of the US-UK 
relations. Yet, during the decade under examination, the ‘special relationship’ 
underwent a change that turned it into what the British historian Bartlett labelled a 
‘muted relationship’
117
. This was due to different factors mainly relating to both British 
interest in joining the European Community and its policy towards the Middle-East 
issue, which had always clashed with the US direction. Indeed, glitches in the special 
partnership between the two countries could be recognized in three different 




The Heath’s Tory government installed in 1970 strongly pushed towards the entry in the 
EEC ̶ occurred on 1 January 1973 ̶  nevertheless the Prime Minister reassured the 
American President Richard Nixon that relations between the two nations would not 
change, since the British government was still committed to maintaining collaboration 
with the US administration
119
. This reassurance was welcomed by the American 
President, since Nixon potentially now could count on new channel of influence through 
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Britain presence in the European Community, in addition to its leadership role within 
the NATO context. The American position at the head of the North Atlantic Alliance 
was slowly undermined at the beginning of the 1970s, mainly because of the unilateral 
initiative of the US administration in foreign policy. Bombings against Cambodia in 
1969, support to the coup d’état in that region, support to the coup led by General 
Pinochet in 1973, together with intervention in support of Israel in the Yom Kippur war 
without consulting its allies made US administration unpopular in the eyes of the 
European countries
120
. The end of the Bretton-Woods system, causing limitation in the 
imports from Europe and Japan, was a further reason for friction. Moreover, American 
domestic policy was undergoing the consequences of the Watergate scandal involving 
President Nixon, undermining his credibility. 
This was the mood, when Kissinger ̶ once again unbeknown to the European allies ̶ 
declared 1973 as the ‘year of Europe’, meaning a renewal of NATO’s bonds and a 
request of a new Atlantic Charter
121
. Behind the demand for a new Declaration of 
principles stood the US objective to linking the European economic matters to the 
military-security matters regarding US-EEC relations
122
. This new diplomatic 
development was connected with the recent enlargement of the European Community: 
as already described in the first chapter, the entry of Great Britain together with Ireland 
and Denmark allowed to plan more ambitious economic agreements, such as the 
European Monetary System, which in US’s eyes could represent a serious threat for the 
American economy. 
There was, however, no intention to develop a policy aiming at dividing the enlarged 
community, as some European State members thought. It was rather an attempt to 
reinvigorate American leadership within the NATO. 
Nevertheless, Kissinger’s plan was a tough testing ground for Britain, divided as it was 
between the ‘special relationship’ and its membership in the EEC. Indeed, US 
administration counted on its preferred ally to work on the Declaration on a US-UK 
basis. Although Heath’s position towards Kissinger’s plan was negative, since he 
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wanted to discuss the issue with the other communitarian states, British officials showed 
a different stance during the meetings with Kissinger
123
. 
This ambiguous direction of UK’s policy contributed to the deterioration of climate 
between the two states during the summer of that same year. The British Ambassador to 
the United States Lord Cromer together with Baron Trend urged Heath to respond 
positively to the US proposal, since Nixon placed great importance on this project
124
. 
Yet, opinions from the British Treasury and officials across many departments were 
skeptical, since they deemed that America plan would have involved a US-EEC 
monetary reform that would have threaten European economic policy developed till 
then
125
. Behind Britain, also France disagreed with the Declaration but, contrary to the 
British, Pompidou’s administration had a not constructive stance. While Britain 
prompted to modify American proposal in accordance with EEC’s interests ̶ thus, with 




Britain was heavily influenced by French position and at a point in the drafting of the 
Declaration, the British turned their back on the US. Indeed, the British Prime Minister 
decided that bilateral negotiations’ records between the two countries relating to the 
declaration should be conveyed to all the communitarian members, whereas UK-EEC 
talks would be led privately
127
. The American response was severe: Britain should be 
undermined by removing the American support on the intelligence and nuclear weapons 
cooperation, whereas the US administration would deal with the German and Italian 
governments
128
. As examined in the first chapter, the latter ,despite its difficult domestic 
situation, promoted an agreement with the Americans in order to give the Community 
an identity in the world
129
. 
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The nuclear cooperation with the Americans was the Achilles’ heel of Great Britain. 
Indeed, Heath’s policy regarding both the transmission of the records and the secrecy of 
UK-EEC meetings was abandoned
130
.  
Despite the renewed stance of the EEC members towards the Declaration of Principles 
and the hurry showed during the negotiations, the crisis in the Middle-East produced 
another reason for friction. 
As already mentioned, the Yom Kippur War fostered European hostility to the United 
States. Nonetheless American intervention was widely misinterpreted at the time: even 
the ‘special’ partner of US deemed it  was an action triggered by Nixon’s domestic 
problems
131
. To Nixon, it was the outcome of a geopolitical strategy to prevent the 
USSR from taking control of the region
132
. 
On the other hand US totally dismissed British’s reason to take a neutral position in this 
conflict: Britain and other European countries ̶ including Italy ̶ relied on Arab oil 
supplies and supporting Israel meant undergoing an embargo. 
The first conflict between the two ‘special’ partners regarded the British refusal of 
tabling a ceasefire resolution entailing a return to the status quo ante bellum. The 
American Secretary of State reassured Britain that the Egyptian President Sadat would 
accept the ceasefire, if it came from the British and added that the US could not present 
such a proposal because of the important role of the Jewish lobby in America
133
. The 
American request was made in the frame of UK-US relations, since Kissinger 
prohibited Great Britain from consulting other States and other members of the 
UNSC
134
. The British refusal heavily irritated the US administration and made it 
reconsider relations between the two states. The situation worsened further when Britain 
made clear that it wouldn’t made available its airbases for US operators in support to 
Israel. 
The last straw causing a damage in US-UK relationships occurred when the US decided 
to heightened the state of alert of their military forces at DEFCON III unbeknownst to 
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all the NATO’s members, but Great Britain
135
. The British Ambassador Cromer was 
informed from the very beginning of the Soviet letter causing the American reaction and 
was told that the US expected a strong support from England
136
. Actually, what arrived 
was the disapproval of the uninformed Prime Minister, who firmly complained about 
American behavior. 
As a consequence, Kissinger wanted to reevaluate US European policy and intelligence 
cooperation with Britain was suspended again
137
. 
US-UK relations further deteriorated during negotiations for a long-term Arab-Israeli 
solution to the war. Arab oil producer countries had threatened Western nations to 
increase the price of  oil and reduce oil production by 5%, if a solution according to UN 
Resolution 242 was not devised. The EEC adopted a pro-Arab stance. British decision 
was hard: it had to choose between not disappointing the Americans and defending its 
interests. Britain heavily depended on Arab oil and antagonize them would mean not 
only economic problems but political troubles as well. Once again, Kissinger was really 
annoyed by Britain and the Community because they spoiled his efforts to find a 
possible long-term solution to the conflict ̶ a solution based on the UN Resolution 242 
would not be accepted by Israel.  
As the oil embargo went on, bilateral agreements were reached by European countries. 
Therefore Kissinger proposed a collaborative consumer response to the Embargo and 
launched the idea of an Energy Action Group to be discussed on an Energy Conference 
involving all the Western states. Publicly, Heath gave his support to the proposal, but 
feared an excessive influence of the US on the EEC’s foreign policy. As always France 
opposed the American proposal and stated that a Communitarian action was required, 
otherwise bilateral agreements should go on. This time Britain followed its own 
interests, since domestic situation was becoming unbearable and Heath’s government 
was undergoing serious difficulty, with the Labor Party asking for his resignation. 
The preparation of the Conference was marked by the restoration of US-UK secret 
diplomacy, although Heath was still cautious regarding a specific goal proposed by 
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Kissinger: enhancing economic and monetary policy cooperation in order to face this 
difficult period
138
. The same objective that inspired the ‘Year of Europe’ plan. 
The Conference held on 11 February 1974 marked a turning point in both American and 
British opinion. As for the former American support for British EEC membership could 
be noticed. The initial American enthusiasm was replaced by the awareness that Britain 
had no fear of opposing the US for the sake of European unity ̶ unless it clashed with 
British interests
139
. As for Britain, it acknowledged that a combined European policy 
was far from being achieved and that the traditional broker role of Britain between the 
US and European states was no longer possible
140
. 
February 1974 saw a reversal in the UK politics: the establishment of a minority Labour 
government destined to last till the end of the decade. Harold Wilson and James 
Callaghan were the Prime Ministers alternating in power during this period and both did 
not share the profound commitment to Europe that marked Heath’s activity. On the 
contrary their political plans involved a closer relations with the US. With reference to 
previous events occurred when Conservative were in power, James Callaghan, acting as 
Foreign Secretary of Wilson, stated his disapproval of the idea that a European unity 
would come out only with a head-on collision with the US
141
. 
Yet, this new English position was not welcomed by the American Administration as 
Britain expected. Indeed, Wilson was truly surprised to confirm that the UK was no 
longer held in high esteem by the American government. A hint of this attitude was the 




Regardless of the ‘muted’ relationship, the presence of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of 
State safeguarded a continuity in the American foreign policy. The US administration 
found helpful having contact with the British government in the second half of the 
1970s, especially because of the insistent Communist threat in the Mediterranean 
area
143
. As it was investigated in the first chapter regarding Italy, the US was strongly 
worried about the Communist progress in Italy especially in the light of the Portuguese 
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Revolution. During these debates, UK proved to have a more lucid and less alarmist 
view of what was happening in the Mediterranean shores and although it felt puzzled 
because of the heavy interference the US was carrying out in Italy, it agreed on 
discussing the issue in a secret meeting at Rambouillet
144
.  
If collaboration between the two countries went on ̶ although muted ̶ during the last 
phase of Kissinger’s era, during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, Britain was 
disregarded and treated as an ordinary European country
145
. The reason behind this 
American standpoint lay mainly in the fact that Britain was undergoing serious 
economic and political problems in the second half of the 1970s: increase in inflation 
make it necessary for London to resort to the hugest loan from the IMF at that time and 
as for politics, the governing party suffered from internal divergence. With such a 
context, the American administration preferred to focus its concern on the increasing 
advancement of the Japanese economy
146
. 
By virtue of what was defined a ‘special relationship’ one could expect that cooperation 
between the parts would be ‘automatic’ or, in a way, ‘instinctive’
147
 thanks to a 
common heritage consisting in shared historic roots and values
148
. Quite the opposite, 
relations between the US and Britain proved to be critically difficult during the 
Seventies, as this paragraph meant to show. The disagreement displayed by the US 
administration sometimes had direct influence on the English foreign policy. Taking it 
to the extreme, Britain suffered in the foreign policy what Italy experienced in its 
domestic field: the US political weight. 
As shown above, the balk of the American disagreement regarded the British 
membership of the EEC. In the following paragraph British efforts in the European 
Integration process are examined. 
2.2 Great Britain in the European Integration 
If the relationship with the US had experienced better periods, the same could not be 
said for British relation with the European Community. The extreme left of the Labour 
Party had always made an issue of Britain joining the EEC. It had opposed British entry 
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since the first attempt made by the Conservative Macmillan’s government in 1963 and 
they would maintain this political line even in the future Britain bids (in 1967 and 
1969)
149
. The reason behind this hostile stance lay mainly on the final European 
objective of a political union ̶ resulting in a political federation ̶ shared by all the other 
European members, Italy included. According to the words of Gaitskell, leader of the 
Labour Party, this eventuality would ‘[…] mean the end of Britain as an independent 
nation state’
150
. Nevertheless, the French veto of both UK’s bids solved the domestic 
conflict. The main reason for this obstacle was to be found in De Gaulle’s concern about 
a greater American influence in the Community. Indeed, by virtue of the ‘special 
relationship’, the French President deemed the UK as the American ‘Trojan Horse’ and 
feared an American influence on the Common Market together with an American 
leverage in the weak European policy
151
. Moreover, a British presence in the 
Community was perceived as a threat for the French leadership. Once Georges 
Pompidou succeeded De Gaulle, French point of view changed and the enlargement of 
the Community was possible. This shift in position was provoked by the increasing 
independence of West Germany’s foreign policy, whose successful ‘Ostpolitik’ ensured 




Thus, from a political stand, the entrance of Britain was supposed to balance power 
within the Community. It was also this reason that moved Italy towards a complete 
support for Britain, as already mentioned in the first chapter, although also other factors 
made cooperation between Italy and Britain possible. In the period between 1969 and 
1973, that is the years of British negotiations, there was a general agreement between 
the UK and Italy on various aspects of the Community. Discussions between the two 
nations dealt with different matters and ranged from the regional policy to the reform of 
European institutions, and from financial cooperation to relations between the enlarged 
Europe and no-Communitarian countries. Nonetheless the two nations did not deem all 
the issues worthy of the same commitment. As shown in the first chapter, Italy strongly 
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backed the reform of Communitarian institution by promoting the universal suffrage of 
the European Parliament. Britain’s point of view on this matter was slightly lukewarm, 
since firstly it demanded clearer boundaries between the national and European 
Parliament as a prerogative and secondly it had to harmonise legislation. Moreover, 
Britain judged the strengthening of the Communitarian Parliament to be an initial stage 
in the process of a federalist Community
153
, an idea that HMG resolutely opposed to.  
On the other hand, among the projects the two states were involved to, there was the 
strengthening of the European funds to reduce the development gap within the EEC. 
Indeed, the project of a regional policy aiming at flattening discrepancy between 
industrialized and rural countries was underestimated during the negotiations of the first 
treaties, mainly because of the belief that a liberal market would overcome regional 
imbalance
154
. Nevertheless, a need for implementation of the regional policy was 
recognized as soon as the idea of the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) was 
proposed during the Paris Summit of October 1972. In a meeting between Andreotti and 
Heath, respectively Italy’s and UK’s Prime Ministers, held before the October Summit, 
the two heads of government agreed on the need for a regional fund, but differed on 
where the bulk of the fund should be allocated: to industrial areas in decline, in the 
British point of view, whereas to retarded rural zones according to Italy. Despite this 
difference, Great Britain and Italy revealed themselves to be allies during the Paris 
Summit and thanks to their pressures, the Community was asked for giving a solution to 
regional problems through the establishment of a Regional Development Fund to be 
operative by 31 December 1973
155
. Significantly, the new Commissioner for Regional 
Policy that year was George Thomson, a British Labour Party MP that presented a 
report assessing the regional disparities and coming up with general directions for 
legislative proposals, including the key aspects of the Regional Fund
156
. As stated in 
Thomson’s report, the Regional Fund was a trial testing the Community solidarity. 
Indeed, it was perceived this way by British pro-Europe politicians, who had to oppose 
the anti-Marketeer propaganda of the Labour Party. This propaganda stressed that no 
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profits would derive from British membership of the Community, focusing on the CAP 
(Common Agricultural Policy) issue, which would cost more to Britain than the country 
could ever benefit from
157
. Thus, in Thomson’s idea, the Regional Fund was a way to 
prove that the UK could benefit from EEC membership
158
. 
Yet, the European Regional Fund (ERF) would be hindered by the dispute over its 
financing ̶ with West Germany and France wanting a smaller budget than that proposed 
by the Commission, in opposition to Great Britain, Ireland and Italy demanding for 
higher coffers ̶ and some technical aspects, regarding the voting method and the 
responsibility of the programmes’ final approval
159
. In addition to technical reasons, 
debates about the ERF were brought to a halt also because of external and domestic 
factors
160
. In the first place, in the oil-crisis context described in the paragraph above, 
tension between European members arouse because of the reluctance of the UK to hold 
discussions about an energy policy, compounding the already rigid stance of the 
German government on the Regional Fund. Secondly, regression following the oil-crisis 
together with the new Labour government’s pledge to renegotiate the terms of British 
entry eclipsed the pursuit of an agreement on the ERF.  
2.2.1 The European Monetary System (EMS): a British Tool for Negotiation 
British and Italian cooperation on backing the project of the Regional Development 
Fund and a fairer reform of the Common Agricultural Policy were not the only fields on 
which Britain and Italy tried to lead a shared strategy. The enterprise of the European 
Monetary System witnessed continuous negotiations between the two nations, which 
could have brought to significant achievement on the aforementioned projects, if only 
the debate had not taken place in very gloomy times for both the countries and Britain 
had not been so doubtful whether joining the EMS or not 
161
. 
In 1978 ̶ the year when the idea of the EMS was proposed at the European Council in 
Copenhagen ̶ Callaghan’s government was undergoing a crisis because of the lack of a 
majority in the House of Commons. The ghost of elections presented itself 
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continuously, the Labour Party always clashed from within and European matters were 
definitely not issues on which it was easy to agree. Callaghan was in a complicated 
situation, since if he accepted the System as it was conceived by the French and 
Germans, he should be ready to cope with discontent within the party ranks. If he did 
not, the sterling crisis would be an eventuality to deal with
162
. At the end, Callaghan 
decided not to incur the split of the party, and already in October 1978 he decided not to 
join the EMS. The Prime Minister hoped that the positive economic situation begun in 
1977  ̶ characterized by the improvement of the balance of payments and a decline in 
inflation ̶ would prolong in order to exploit it in the forthcoming electoral campaign
163
. 
Nevertheless Callaghan had already linked EMS negotiations to the reconsideration of 
the CAP and overall, to a redistribution of resources in its favour
164
. Thus, in order not 
to compromise the outcome to the ongoing concurrent studies on resource transfers, 
Callaghan decided not to make clear to other European states ̶ not even the Italian ally ̶ 
his decision about the EMS
165
. 
It has to be said that many States within the Community saw the attempt by the UK to 
link the EMS discussions to a modification of the CAP as a way of a further 
renegotiation and as an endeavour to destroy the Agricultural Policy
166
. Within the 
Community only Germany and Italy agreed on its modification. Despite the first was a 
major contributor of the Community expenditure and thus aimed at reducing the CAP 
costs, it could not support the British attempt for domestic reasons. 
Thus, Italy proved to be the only possible ally for Great Britain. Yet, as the politician 
Edmund Dell noticed, Italian and British objectives were not perfectly aligned
167
. 
Firstly, the peninsula wanted a reduction in subsidies to North European agricultural 
only to secure more subsidy to Mediterranean agriculture, whereas Britain’s goal was an 
overall reform aiming at reducing high import prices for food from other member states. 
Secondly, Italy was leading discussions on the CAP separately from the concurrent 
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studies, thus implying that it saw no connections between the CAP’s review and the 
development of the European Monetary System
168
. 
Although Great Britain had already chose not to join the EMS, it kept on collaborating 
with the Italian government. This was of paramount importance, since it was thought 
that France was acting in order to split Italy from the UK, granting concessions to Rome 
on the resource transfers for securing its entry to the EMS. Indeed, the French were 




As already accounted in the first paragraph, Italy joined the system even though its 
close ally backed away from it. Their divergent paths were to be connected to their 
different stance towards Europe. As previously described, Callaghan had to cope with 
the Labour Party’s opposition to any kind of European policy; moreover, the European 
choice was always called into question in Britain ̶ the latest membership referendum 
was held just three years earlier. As for Italy, it had always proved its loyalty to the 
ideal of Europe, but its pursuit of a practical programme inside the Community pushed 
it closer to the UK
170
. Yet, this time a political alignment with Great Britain would have 
meant being isolated from the rest of the group. 
Despite their different decisions on the EMS, the two governments showed themselves 
wishful for carrying on cooperation and addressing it to prompting reform of the 
Community budget and the Common Agricultural Policy
171
. 
Actually, Anglo-Italian relations went into a dramatic decline since then. Britain tended 
to underestimate Italy’s role within the EEC and undervalue the benefits a collaboration 
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2.2.2 Universal suffrage of the European Parliament: the British stance 
Following the path marked in the first chapter, here is given an overall account of the 
British stance on direct elections for the Community Parliament. 
As mentioned in the section regarding Britain’s entry into the Community, Britain’s and 
Italy’s point of view diverged, as far as universal suffrage of the European Parliament 
was concerned. 
In January 1973, during the celebration of Britain’s membership, the then Prime 
Minister Edward Heath stated that ‘[…] our objective of a democratic Community is not 
going to be misdirected by a desire to see direct elections to the European 
Parliament’
173
. Indeed, at that time, the Conservative government entered the 
Community in prospect of widening its market, not surely aiming at what it saw as a 
development of Europe into a federalist union. 
Despite of the declaration signed in 1969, in which Italian and British government 
agreed on the need of an integrated Europe ̶ entailing direct elections of the European 
parliament, as well ̶ the bulk of British were reluctant to the suffrage. It has to be 
noticed that discussions over direct elections came six months later than the 
membership referendum: the atmosphere was still imbued with slogans on the loss of 
sovereignty that a full integration would mean.  
The Conservative Party, through the words of its leader Mrs. Thatcher, expressed its 
support to the direct elections issue, marking it as a Treaty duty. Thus, it was felt as an 
external constraint by some English politicians, whereas Italian government 
acknowledged its strategic importance to hinder a Europe led by the Franco-German 
axis. Actually, at that time, also Mrs. Thatcher understood that the Parliament was the 
only communitarian institution able to balance the Commission’s and the Council of 
Ministers’ power; hence, the need of bestowing electoral legitimacy on it
174
. 
As for the Labour Party, it strongly opposed the idea of direct elections. It was Labour 
MPs’ opinion that the process of integration was undergoing a not natural acceleration. 
Indeed, they argued that a more democratic Community was firstly to be reached by 
balance in the budget and resources distribution rather than by direct elections of 
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institutions people are not familiar with
175
. What actually some Labours feared was that 
a stronger European Parliament would threat national independence
176
. 
Despite the fact that during the Labour Party Conference of September 1976, the Labour 
members had voted a motion against direct elections, the government stated that it 
would lay the required legislation before Parliament in the short term
177
. 
A pivotal reason causing the Labour government’s decision of direct election was due to 
a domestic issue. The Liberal Party, the major supporting party of Callaghan’s 
government by means of the Lib-Lab Pact, was strongly committed to the process of 
European integration, hence not only the key advocate of the universal suffrage of the 
European Parliamentary Assembly, but also a supporter of the proportional system of 
voting, in contrast to most Labour MPs, endorsing the ‘first-past-the-post’ system
178
. 
Finally, in November 1977 the English parliament approved Euro-elections but rejected 
the bill proposing the proportional system, making it necessary to reintroduce the ‘first-
past-the-post’ system, causing a delay in the European election date
179
. 
2.3 The G7: Great Britain’s position  
In the first paragraph both origins of the G7 and Italian effort to be part of the group 
were examined. It was said the opposition mounted by Paris to the possibility of an 
Italian participation, and it was mentioned the pivotal role Great Britain had on 
endorsing Italy’s participation to the summit to be held in Rambouillet. Indeed, each 
host had its preference for nations they thought should be invited to the summit. While 
France was determined to hold a meeting involving only the three European major 
countries and the US, the Federal Republic of Germany expressed its desire to include 
Japan, so that Germany would not be the only country defeated in the World War II
180
. 
The Americans strongly pushed France to include Canada in the list as a major partner 
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of the US, but Giscard dissented from this idea, since otherwise minor European 
countries would demand for a seat in the summit, as well
181
. 
Both the UK and the US were concerned about Italy’s economic and political situation. 
Italian economy was judged to be deteriorating and its fate was linked to the world’s 
economic situation, which should improve in order to bring about a change to an 
economy, which would otherwise collapse
182
. 
As for the Italian political situation, in an informal meeting held during the CSCE in 
Helsinki, President Ford and Prime Minister Wilson, together with their Secretary of 
State, commented Italian condition as critical, because of the weakness of Moro’s 




Hence, the English and the Americans backed Italy’s participation to the Rambouillet 
summit, mostly because of the negative consequences its absence could arise than for 
contribution its presence could make. Finally, Italy was accepted also by France and the 
West Germany on grounds of their domestic political reasons and not because they were 
in charge of the presidency of the European Council of Ministers at the time
184
. 
Although it belonged to the original group of the summit, Great Britain’s economic and 
political conditions were not better than Italy’s. As for the first, Great Britain had 
experienced, during the 1970s, a mix of circumstances marked with exceptionalism, 
since they revealed record breaking figures. A large-scale unemployment, the highest 
inflation since the aftermath of the World War I, a serious setback in output and a 
severe crisis in industries and firms
185
. 
Regarding British politics, it could not be said that Wilson’s government ̶ succeeded to 
the Conservative Heath in 1974  ̶ reached an overwhelming consensus in the British 
Parliament. Indeed, at first he formed a government supported by minority groups, 
guaranteeing very little stability to the cabinet. Not only economy was characterized by 
record breaking figures in those years, but also the political scene, which witnessed two 
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general elections in a single year, i.e. 1974, an event that had not happen since 1910. In 
the October general elections, however, the Labour Party succeeded in achieving a 
majority, although narrow.  
In this background, a further factor placed Great Britain in a delicate situation, i.e. the 
renegotiation of EEC membership and the Referendum held on 5
 
June 1975, whose 
result confirmed the British belonging to the Community but probably made the 
German and French governments sceptic on the British commitment. Indeed, in a report 
drafted by the British Embassy in Paris in the aftermath of the economic summit, the 
French attitude towards Great Britain was described as ‘qualified and watchful’
186
. 
In such a climate of economic weakness and political instability, Great Britain took a 
moderate position during the Rambouillet summit in 1975. The French objective of 
fixed parity exchange rates in the style of the Bretton Woods system ̶ pursued during the 
summit  ̶stood in contrast with the profits of countries with a weak economy, i.e. Britain 
and Italy. Nonetheless in accordance with a German strategy, Wilson agreed that fixed 
parities would be a topic of discussion for the summit, so that negotiations on the IMF 
quotas would be conducted in a constructive way by French
187
. 
In the end, only general economic and financial matters were discussed during the 
summit meeting, but every nation judged useful the gathering. Indeed, despite of the 
lack of a remarkable agreement among the participants, a profit was that the assembly 
could be informed of domestic political elements and international forces influencing 
the policy of each country
188
. 
During the summit, both Moro and the British Chancellor Healey stressed the urgency 
to focus the Western attention on the issue of unemployment, which was a common 
plague within the participants
189
. Moreover, both Italy and Britain highlighted the 
importance of a gradual reduction of the budget deficit from the healthy countries, since 
this would entail a damage in the recovery of the other ill nations, such as Britain and 
Italy, which suffered high rates of inflation. Hence, the major countries were warned by 
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the British and Italians, since their economy could affect the rest of the world’s 
recovery
190
. Yet, since Rambouillet the opposite occurred with Britain’s and Italy’s 
worsening economy affecting other European nations. Indeed, devaluation of their 
currencies in the two countries put severe pressure on the French franc
191
. 
Both British and Italian government kept on adopting expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies, causing a serious budget deficit and running up huge foreign debts. For this 
reason, Britain’s economy had started being cause for alarm in the US administration 
since the very beginning of 1976.  
It was already said in the first paragraph that Italy represented the major concern of the 
United States and European countries by the time of Puerto Rico, because of both its 
economy and the ‘red scare’ of the Communist rise. It has to be added now that Italy 
was not alone, as far as the economic troubles were concerned. Indeed, the ‘special 
partner’ of Great Britain used to tackle Italian and British situation jointly, as it can be 
noticed from documents of the Ford Administration
192
. 
Before the second G7 summit, the US administration had found a solution to the 
problem of aiding the two countries and at the same time having reassurances that 
practical measures would be implemented by their governments in order to undertake a 
programme of domestic economic and financial stabilisation
193
. Resorting to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) would guarantee the provision of official credit in 
accordance with the fulfilment of structural reform programmes. In the aftermath of the 
Puerto Rico summit, both Great Britain and Italy got a loan from the IMF; furthermore, 
the first was granted the largest loan ever requested from the IMF at the time, namely 
nearly $ 4 billion  ̶although Britain did not need to withdraw the whole amount
194
. 
This was the British background in the year of the Puerto Rico Summit: a broken 
nation, aware of the difficult period it was going through, but reluctant to be connected 
to Italy’s fate. This defensive stance was adopted by the British Prime Minister in a 
bilateral meeting with President Ford in the first morning of the summit, during which 
Callaghan vigorously defended his government’s economic policy, stating his ‘own 
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determination […] to move with all possible speed towards our goals of beating 
inflation and achieving a strong, sustainable and balanced recovery’
195
. But in order to 
achieve this goal ̶ by bolstering British social consensus and thus political stability ̶ 
Callaghan demanded that the US administration recognized the British efforts and 
showed appreciation for what the Labour government had already achieved, instead of 
publicly criticizing the slow process of recovery
196
. Going on with his defence, 
Callaghan wanted to make the difference between Italy and Great Britain clear to his 
special partner, commenting that ‘our social consensus is not only an economic factor. It 
is a political factor of immense importance, a guarantee of political stability. When 




Despite of its condition of ‘sick man of Europe’, Great Britain was among the four 
countries discussing a concerted way to react to the threat of Communists gaining 
governmental position in Italy. 
As mentioned in the first paragraph, the Puerto Rico summit was preceded by secret 
talks demanded by the US administration and involving Heads of government of Great 
Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The three European countries 
were already discussing  programme of official and non-official alerts to Italy in order 
to avoid the scenario of Communists entering government when the Americans 
proposed a summit for debating the ‘Italian case’
198
. 
European countries were sceptical about the effectiveness of such a meeting and some 
analyses of the British Foreign Office underlined the fact that official and non-official 
statements from the United States, France and West Germany about the danger of the 
Italian Communists entering the government would be more effective in forestalling 
such a scenario
199
. Actually, British officials feared that the agenda of the summit would 
deal mostly with economic issues, embarrassing the Callaghan’s government
200
. 
Economy was indeed the keystone of the summit and  the possibility of an economic aid 
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to weak countries opened up on condition that they committed themselves to adopting 
monetary and fiscal reforms internationally approved. In the specific case of Italy, it 
included also excluding the Communists from the government. 
Although British officials were worried about the chance of a governmental position of 
the Italian Communist Party, they were puzzled by the attitude of the three Western 
countries, judged by the British as openly interfering on Italian politics
201
. In Britain’s 
point of view, the Americans, the French and the Germans had devised an anachronistic 
programme, entailing a reform of the wage policy and cuts in public spending that 
would be impossible without involving the Communist party. British doubts made the 
UK adopt a low-profile stance towards the Italian situation and refrain from giving any 
kind of statement against the PCI.  
2.4 The Middle-East issue in the British foreign policy 
As outlined in the first paragraph, the Middle-East policy of Western states during the 
1970s tended to correspond to their reaction to the Yom-Kippur War, thus their position 
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
For Britain, circumstances were more complicated than other Western countries, since, 
as it was described in the paragraphs above, its foreign policy in that region was deeply 
intertwined with both British EEC membership and its 'special relationship’ with the 
Americans. 
It was set forth before how Great Britain  was committed to developing a 
communitarian foreign policy, especially during the Conservative government led by 
Heath. It was mentioned in the first chapter the initiative of the Euro-Arab dialogue ̶ 
endorsed by France and other European states, including Italy ̶ aiming at holding direct 
talks between the Community and Arab world in order to tackle the oil crisis problem in 
the short-term period, and establishing permanent relations between the two parties 
regarding financial, economic and cultural cooperation. 
It was reported that Italy joined the ranks of the committed supporters of the initiative 
from the very beginning, greeting the project enthusiastically. Regarding Great Britain, 
joining the Euro-Arab dialogue required careful considerations at that time, hence its 
delay in granting its approval to the proposal. 
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Britain’s major concerns over the dialogue was due to various assessments: first of all, 
the effects of the dialogue on British interests in the Middle-Eastern region; secondly, 
the Israeli response to the project and lastly, the American reaction in light of the peace 
negotiations conducted by Kissinger
202
. Regarding this last aspect, it played a huge role 
in preventing Great Britain agreeing immediately to the dialogue. Indeed, the US 
administration feared that this kind of initiative would result in political declaration ̶ like 
the Brussels Declaration of November 1973 ̶ considered unfavourable to the shuttle 
diplomacy of the Secretary Kissinger
203
. 
Despite the American warnings, the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath 
supported the project involving the nine and the Arab world, stating the importance of a 
united Europe, which would prevent each European member being treated differently 
from the Arabs states. Numerous statements were released by the Conservative 
government, aiming at reassuring Americans that the dialogue was detached from the 
peace-making process. These announcements, however, would be ineffective and the 
Americans kept on being suspicious even with the establishment of the new Labour 
government, which surprisingly declared itself to be favourable to the Euro-Arab 




The British Labour Party had always had a traditional pro-Israel stance because of its 
close links with the country, hence its government had to justify its decision on 
supporting the dialogue to a bewildered Israel. The British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, James Callaghan, repeatedly reassured Israeli officials that Britain was 
not adopting a biased policy in favour of Arabs, but trying to secure the Arab oil 
supplies, while strongly opposing to a politicization of the Euro-Arab cooperation
205
. 
The Arab countries, indeed, were pressing the European states for the PLO (Palestinian 
Liberation Organization) participation to the talks, causing a serious split within the 
Community, since France, Ireland and Italy declared themselves sympathetic to PLO 
representatives, while Britain along with West Germany, the Nederland and Denmark 
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. The Labour policy on PLO remained unchanged till the end 
of the decade: from Callaghan’s viewpoint the Palestinian organization could not join 
the Euro-Arab dialogue because of both its refusal to recognize Israel as a State and the 
exploitation of terrorism as a political tool
207
. 
In spite of the pressing regarding the PLO participation, the Labour government 
regarded the Euro-Arab issue a matter of urgency, affecting both its Communitarian 
interests and its partnership with Arabs, hence requiring a prompt positive decision
208
. 
Indeed, as for the European Community, Great Britain was undergoing the process of 
renegotiation of EEC membership terms and coming across as detached from the 
Communitarian concerns on the Middle-East issue would not be fruitful in the 
consultations. On Arabs part, if a negative solution was adopted by the British, the latter 
would be regarded responsible for the breakdown of a constructive dialogue and tough 
measures against Britain would be certainly implemented.  
The British government eventually decided to take part to the dialogue ̶  upon 
Washington’s permit  ̶ and declared its resolution at a European Ministerial Summit in 
Luxembourg on 2 April 1974
209
. 
The Euro-Arab cooperation field ranged from culture and social question to agriculture 
and scientific and technological matters. Britain was involved in each area of the 
project, nonetheless it had a direct action on the financial field, in which London had a 
co-chair role in the working group alongside of the Arabs
210
. 
Albeit Britain attached considerable importance on the cooperation with the Arab world, 
it regarded the Euro-Arab dialogue only an addition to the existing bilateral agreements. 
In spite of its frequent statements concerning the non-political nature of the initiative, 
London’s interest in the Euro-Arab talks was actually political. Britain could take 
advantage of the dialogue in order to strengthen its relations with the Arabs and make it 
less easy for them place the British under pressure as far as Israel was concerned
211
. 
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This resulted in an increase in exports, which doubled in a time span of two years, that 
is from 1973 to 1975
212
. 
These positive trends were counterbalance by the deadlock reached by the Euro-Arab 
cooperation. As mentioned in the first chapter, it slowly sank because of repeated Arab 
requests for a PLO participation, in the attempt of gaining political outcome; but also 
because the Community proved to be reluctant to delegate power to European 
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3 Political Violence: an introductory insight into the Red Brigades 
3.1 An overall outlook on the phenomenon of political terrorism 
A compelling preface written by sociologist Filippo Barbano as an introduction to the 
book Dimensioni del Terrorismo Politico. Aspetti Interni e Internazionali, Politici e 
Giuridici
214
, through an examination of conspiracy across history, gives an enlightening 
insight on how the terroristic phenomenon during the Seventy’s decade could be 
explained in a far future, exploiting the explanatory metaphor of the Catilinarian 
conspiracy employed in an “industrial society”
215
. What happened in that decade, 
according to Barbano, was a similar conspiracy ‘[…] against the State or to revolt it, 
arranged by a certain amount of “invisible” actors, ideologically armed […]’
216
. The 
concept of invisibility is something peculiar of terrorists. A terrorist lives two lives and 
they radically differs each other, since his ‘[…] public image is that of a perfect office 
worker. [He] do[es]n’t talk about politics at work. […] Out of the organization, the only 
person that knows [his] activity is [his] wife’
217
. This aspect will prove to be 
fundamental for a better understanding of a terrorist’s identikit in the following 
paragraph, since it is the element that places the terrorist actor in a blurred line, in an 
half way between a soldier and what is called civilian. 
Features like the ones mentioned above have developed over the centuries. Observing 




 the period of the French revolutionary government, between 1793 and 1794. It is 
the time when the term made its appearance in the political language, even 
though with the meaning of “terror”; 
 the second phase took place in the second half of the Nineteenth centuries and it 
is characterized by both populism terrorism and trademark individualist 
anarchism terrorism; 
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 the last one, is the period covering the Seventies, with its starting point placed in 
the time between 1967 and 1968. 
Professor Bonanate’s essay dates back to 1979, this is the reason why the last phase 
doesn’t go beyond the Seventies. Probably, a fourth phase can be traced, a phase 
corresponding to nowadays terrorism, marked by IS attacks. A phase characterized by a 
polarizing aspect ̶  which sees God’s people opposing the rest of the world ̶ specific of 
religious fights
219
. About this, the political analyst Bruce Hoffman noted that:  
There may have been, in aggregate, more terrorism in the Seventies and Eighties, but it was 
discriminate […] They kept their terrorism within boundaries related to their cause. Today it’s 
different. It’s less predictable, less coherent and less cohesive. It leaves the impression of 
serendipity. ISIS posts pictures of a vehicle and says get in your car and drive into people—and that’s 
all it takes.
220   
The less predictability of nowadays transnational terrorism is to be found in its religious 
nature, which dates back to the early 1990s. Indeed, religious fundamentalist groups 
prove to abide by duties that they believe imposed by their religion ̶ justifying in this 
way violence against women and children ̶ and consequently showing their disregard of 
social norms
221
. It has largely been discussed whether terrorism of present days is a new 
phenomenon or is just a development, which goes at the same pace of historical 
changes. What is unanimously agreed is the distinctive feature that differentiates 
nowadays terrorists from the old terroristic organizations: the first are moved by 
religious motivations whereas the latter were politically motivated
222
. Although it was 
pointed out how some elements pertinent to religion could be traced also in the 
terrorism of the Seventies, e. g. in Northern Ireland, where the fight between the 
unionist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) sometimes 
assumed connotations of a religious conflict
223
. This unexpected aspect is justified by 
the “Wave” concept of Rapoport. According to the Professor, four phases, i.e. waves, 
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can be identified across centuries as far as terrorism is concerned
224
. The concept of 
wave is exploited in order to convey the irregular changes occurring in the period of 
time examined, ‘[…] characterized by expansion and contraction phases’
225
. Each wave 
takes its name by the dominant energy, i.e. ideology, but this doesn’t mean that it is 
‘[…] its only feature. Nationalist organizations in various numbers appear in all waves, 
for example, and each wave shaped its national elements differently’
226
. Rapoport’ 
subdivision slightly differs from the one theorized by Bonanate and has an additional 




 the “Anarchist Wave”, corresponding to the Eighties of the Nineteenth century, 
approximately lasting forty years; 
 the “Anti-colonial Wave”, starting in the 1920s till roughly 1960s; 
 the “New Left Wave”, covering the period from the late 1960s to the 1990s; 
 the “Religious Wave” made its appearance in 1979, year of the fall of the last 
Iranian Shah, Reza Pahlavi. 
A difficult periodization of the terroristic phenomenon probably derives from the 
original problematic of its definition.  
3.1.1 Terrorism: a problematic definition 
What is essential as far as an outlook of the phenomenon of political terrorism is 
concerned is its definition, since, as the philosopher Giuliano Pontara noticed, it is 
important to point out a delimitation of the term able to distinguish it from other kinds 
of political violence, such as the guerrilla warfare or political murders
228
. The 
formulation of a definition is not purely a terminological exercise. Firstly, its research is 
pivotal for a fully understanding of the phenomenon, which can endow institutions ̶ as 
well as groups of individuals ̶  with instruments, by means of which fighting terrorism. 
Secondly, it is critical as far as the juridical level is concerned. Nowadays, the major 
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issue examined is whether terrorists should be considered soldiers or criminals
229
. This 
distinction is far from being only theoretical, on the contrary it involves practical and 
juridical consequences. Indeed, the first case would imply imprisonment, even before 
any trial, till the end of the “war of terror”, whereas the second case would entail a 
standard treatment as an ordinary citizen, respecting the civil rights of the individual
230
.  
It is also remarkable to establish an accurate definition so that it can be far from any 
ideological identification and ‘[…] terrorist methods can turn out to be both fighting 
methods led by revolutionaries and those led by armed forces and the police […]’
231
. 
Yet, since the inquiry about terrorism was launched, its definition represented a 
complex dispute. Reasons behind this difficulty are numerous. First of all, the term 
mirrors a negative meaning useful for a political propaganda, in order to delegitimize 
the counterpart. The term is even avoided by those who exploit violence following what 
is regarded to be a terroristic behaviour; conscious of the negative connotation, these 
persons prefer rather to call themselves “freedom fighters”
232
. 
A further obstacle to the establishment of a clear and precise definition is due to the 
blurred boarders of the phenomenon. Indeed, the distinction between terrorism and 
other kinds of political violence like guerrilla, civil wars or coup is not so 
straightforward
233
. In the attempt of conceptualizing terrorism, it often occurs that  ̶
accidentally or not ̶ an ethical judgment is made, so that the definition could mirror a 
specific standpoint. However, it could be useful to keep in mind some definitions and be 
aware of their limits.  
A general description, which has anyway the credit of including the threat to the 
psychical sphere of the subjects was conceived by the Italian philosopher Giuliano 
Pontara:  
[…] a terrorist act is every act, carried out as part of a political fighting method ̶ that is, aiming at 
conquering or defending the state power  ̶  involving the use of extreme violence ̶ the imposition 
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of physical or psychical death, or physical or psychical sufferings and injuries ̶ against innocent 
people ̶  meaning not warriors […].234 
The more ambiguous the phenomenon is, the more compelling it is pinpointing a 
definition able to clarify its boundaries and establish delimitations. Professor Bonanate 
identifies ambiguity as the essential feature of political terrorism
235
. Indeed, both the 
rival parties involved in this violent phenomenon would accuse of terrorism the 
counterpart, so that institutions blame on revolutionaries, who undermine the State’s 
existence; on the other side, revolutionaries justify their actions as reactions to the terror 
imposed by the State
236
. A further element of ambiguity of this particular kind of 
political violence is that factions involved are always stating the necessity and 
inevitability of their actions as justifications of their behaviour
237
. Thus, terrorism would 
be the final, inevitable step of the wider category of political violence, to which group 
of people or individuals resort in order to make political requests to the authority, 
requests that are no longer conveyable through the standard “social mechanism”; or it 
could also be the ultimate act of a political bargaining, in which the parties have 
recourse to violence in order to prove their ability and test their rival’s capacity to cope 
with violence
238
. As Professor Bonanate explains: ‘[…] then terrorism would be the 
pathology of the political violence, the symptom of a stuck situation’, the resulting 
condition when political requests and bargaining are refused by the parties
239
. Keeping 
in mind the main features of necessity and inevitability, Professor Bonanate comes to 
the following definition of the terrorist phenomenon: 
[…] the definition of terrorism can be applied to all those expressions of violence, against which 
no possibility of bargaining is identified. Thus, terrorism ̶  since its definition doesn’t depend on 
the objective nature of the acts, but on the way they are judged by the addressee ̶ will be that 
political violence, which doesn’t allow any responses aiming at opening to political negotiations; 
lastly, terrorism is considered by those who believe that they cannot accept any compromise, 
which could avoid the total defeat of the rival. The terrorist situation is one in which any channel 
of political communication is interrupted, or rather unusable.240 
As Pontara’s definition, the above description of terrorism is far from any ideological 
interpretation and can include both State institutions and revolutionaries among 
                                                 
234
 Pontara, “Violenza e Terrorismo. Il Problema Della Definizione e Della Giustificazione,” 58. 
235
 Bonanate, “Dimensioni Del Terrorismo Politico,” 99–101. 
236
 Ibid., 101. 
237
 Ibid., 103. 
238
 Ibid., 102. 
239
 Ibid., 102–103. 
240
 Ibid., 104. 
64 
 
terrorists. What is relevant in Bonanate’s definition is the recognition of the subjectivity 
of the act’s nature; indeed, established that the interpretation of the deed is up to the 
addressee, what situates the act in the terrorism rank is the impossibility of negotiation.  
Both Pontara’s and Bonanate’s definitions were conceived during the culmination of the 
terrorist period in Italy, that is 1979. Nowadays, scholars and academics haven’t come 
up with a solution of the terroristic issues yet, in fact it has actually assumed more 
complex shades, which have brought some scholars to device the concept of the “New 
Terrorism”.  
3.1.2 A further attempt in categorizing terrorism 
A final categorization of the terrorist phenomenon, conceived by Professor Bonanate
241
, 
considers four groups of terrorism, which are devised as a couple of choices. The first 
set, as the Professor explains, concerns the adequacy of the means exploited for the 
purpose. This set involves the strategic terrorism and the tactical terrorism. The first 
kind can be identified when three circumstances occur, that is a) a wide imbalance 
between the parts involved, b) the impossibility, according to whom resort to the act, of 
acting differently, c) the effectiveness of the chosen means. When these three 
circumstances occur and there is a constant resorting to terrorist acts, a strategy can be 
recognized. To the contrary, the tactical terrorism involves violent acts that are part of a 
wider fight, thus they are not the only instrument, which the parts resort to. 
The second set of classification is the finalistic and instrumental terrorism. This 
categorization regards terrorism in relation to its goal, thus violent acts acted to directly 
achieve the wanted goal are expression of instrumental terrorism, whereas actions 
carried out in order to obtain more favorable conditions for the accomplishment of one’s 
own purpose are categorized as belonging to the finalistic terrorism. Since actions 
carried out by the latter has no meaning in itself, making unstable the current situation is 
its only aim. Examples of this kind of terrorism are carried through with by the Red 
Brigades across the Seventies.     
3.2 Terrorism in Italy 
Internal terrorism hit Italy at the end of 1960s and across 1970s. It was not a 
homogenous phenomenon and this represented its peculiar feature. A first distinction 
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possible is between Black and Red Terrorism, respectively and simplistically far right-
wing terrorism and left-wing terrorism. The first dates back to the very beginning of the 
Cold War but its actions were sporadic; around the turn of 1968 it got into action as a 
response to worker and student protests
242
. Moreover, in those years Italian institutions 
were constantly menaced by the threat of a military coup ̶ by the hands of Junio Valerio 
Borghese ̶ destined to fail. 
As far as Red Terrorism is concerned, the terrorist organization of the Red Brigades 
ended up monopolising the whole category. Perhaps it is a simplistic way of 
categorizing the left-wing terrorism, yet it matches the reality. The book La mappa 
perduta
243
 provides a thorough depiction of all the left-wing organizations active in 
Italy from 1969 to 1989. Although the terrorist groups that were counted in those years 
were myriad, the project carried out by the book’s authors found that forty-seven were 
actually working and operative
244
. Among these, twenty-four were pointed out as the 
major organizations operating across the period of twenty years. Below it is reported, 
following a chronological order, a brief report of the main groups that contribute to 
swell the ranks of the Red Brigades
245
.  
3.2.1 Gruppi d’Azione Partigiana-GAP 
The history of the first left-wing clandestine armed organization is strictly linked to the 
controversial life of its founder, the Italian publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli.  
What can be easily said about Feltrinelli is that he was a billionaire belonging to the 
Milanese upper class, but a label doesn’t fit for describing a complex man like Osvaldo ̶ 
his nom de guerre. It is a common opinion that Feltrinelli by founding his armed 
organization GAP- Gruppi d’Azione Partigiana (Partisan Action Groups) was pursuing 
the aim of contrasting an imminent coup d’état
246
. The retraction of this conjecture came 
from a public statement read during the trial Gap-Feltrinelli held on March 31, 1979
247
. 
His armed struggle was not only directed to contrast a possible coup, yet it was part of a 
global ‘Communist and anti-imperialist strategy’
248
, which could rely on revolutionary 
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vanguards in Asia, Africa, Latin American, and on the fundamental component of this 
strategy provided by the military force of the Soviet Union
249
. The trust in the Soviet 
Union was the discriminating factor between the GAP on one hand and the Red 
Brigades and Potere Operaio (Worker’s Power)
250
 on the other. Nevertheless, 
disagreement about this matter did not prevent collaboration among these organizations 
and when the GAP ceased to exist, guns were distributed between the Red Brigades and 
Potere Operaio. 
At the beginning of their armed campaign, between September and October 1970, the 
GAP signed sabotages against building sites, where mortal accidents at the expense of 
workers happened. More relevant deeds where carried out between the end of 1970 and 
the beginning of 1971: by the means of some modified radios, the group succeeded in 
interfering with national radio channels in order to gather other organizations to be 
employed for the common struggle
251
. Collaboration in cities like Trento, Genoa, Turin 
and Milan were created.  
The GAP could also boast international collaborations. Feltrinelli took part in the 
organization of the killing of the Bolivian consul Roberto Quintanilla, former police 
chief in Bolivia and regarded by revolutionaries responsible for the arrest and the killing 
of Ernesto “Che” Guevara
252
. The gun Monika Ertl used to kill Roberto Quintanilla on 
April 1, 1972 in Hamburg was the property of Feltrinelli
253
. 
With Giangiacomo Feltrinelli’s death on March 14, 1972 and the arrest of the last two 
militants a month later, GAP died out. 
3.2.2 Gruppo XXII Ottobre 
Like GAP, the XXII October group was also part of the ranks of Marxist-Leninists. It 
was established on October 22, 1969 in Genoa by Mario Rossi, Augusto Viel, Giuseppe 
Battaglia, Adolfo Sanguineti and Alfredo Maino
254
. It counted among its ranks 
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proletarians coming from the Genoese Valley Val Bisagno. The group’s struggle 
concerned the Collective Labour Agreements, which was a main issue in the period 
between 1968 and 1970; the group was also propagator of the fight against Genoese 
industrialists, regarded to be the embodiment of the new Fascist oppression
255
. Radio 
interferences during the newscast, explosive attacks against the office of the Partito 
Socialista Unitario (Unitary Socialist Party), against the  US general consulate ̶ 
considered the principal author of the spread around the world of imperialism ̶ 
kidnapping for financing purposes, together with sabotages to industrial sites in 
Genoese area
256
. In 1971 the group’s militants were captured or fugitive. After their 
capture, a steadfast campaign was led against those groups more offensive. The Red 
Brigades with the kidnapping of the judge Mario Sossi ̶ crown prosecutor against the 
group XXII October in the first instance trial ̶ aimed at claiming the belonging of the 
group to the revolutionary process and requested their release
257
. 
3.2.3 Nuclei Armati Proletari-NAP 
In the wake of the student and worker protest, a new experience in the Italian landscape 
developed: prisons in the biggest Italian cities are shaken by recurring uprisings against 
the prison system. What is peculiar of this organization is the encounter between 
political fight and social fight: prisoners acquired political consciousness thanks to 
political militants, key players in the student and worker riots
258
. Their cultural 
indoctrination was based on the revolutionary Marxism-Leninism ideology and 
regarding contemporary influence, it involved works by Frantz Fanon and Eldridge 
Cleaver
259
, leading figure of the Black Panther Party. Prisons were considered the 
outcome of the capitalism system and social inequality. Political avant-gardes started 
spreading among prisoners and some of these were supported by organizations like 
Soccorso Rosso (Red Aid) and by the far-left extra-parliamentary organization Lotta 
Continua (Continuous Struggle), which had a specific commission for what concerned 
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. Between 1972 and 1973, the prison abolition movement made clear its will 
to move to the clandestine armed struggle in order to overthrow the prison system and 
free prisoners belonging to the movement
261
. Following these demands, Lotta 
Continua’s support failed and many militants left the organization
262
. It goes back to 
this period the formation, in Florence and Naples, of the original group of the Nuclei 
Armati Proletari, which counted among its ranks ex-prisoners and students
263
. Actually, 
as reported in the account written by the journalist Bocca, group’s composition was 
very peculiar, since it was mixed: there were both militants like Giovanni Gentile 
Schiavone and Maria Pia Vianale belonging to bourgeois families and combatants like 
Giuseppe “Sergio” Romeo, who spent his adolescence in the reformatory
264
. During its 
activity period ̶ from 1974 to 1977  ̶ the Nuclei Armati Proletari group led varied 
subversive actions, which almost immediately counted fatalities among the group’s 
militants
265
. It was a peculiarity of the group to install loudspeaker ̶ ready to blow up 




The Nuclei Armati Proletari group seemed to be informed with the same fight method 
of the Red Brigades: raids against the offices of the Christian Union Business Leader 
(Unione Cristiana Imprenditori Dirigienti) and  of the Christian Democracy, together 
with the kidnapping formula ̶ on this point, it is to remember the kidnapping of the 
magistrate Giuseppe Di Gennaro ̶ followed by the claim of responsibility according to 
the self-interview scheme
267
. Yet, the difference between the two organizations existed 
and concerned both the logistic level and the ideological level, as well. As far as the first 
is concerned, the Red Brigades relied on the strict distinction and autonomy among its 
pillars, whereas the Nuclei Armati Proletari’s branches relied completely on the section 
based in Naples
268
. As regards militants, the Red Brigades is more selective than Nuclei 
Armati Proletari and even if prisons are exploited for revolutionary use, selection is 
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. On the other hand there is the use of explosive, widely exploited by the NAP 
but firmly rejected by the Red Brigades because of its negative effect on the public 
opinion
270




In 1977, the experience of the NAP ceased to exist and some militants flew into the Red 
Brigades. Together with the workforce, weapons and hideouts were acquired by the Red 
Brigades. 
3.2.4 Formazioni Comuniste Armate-FCA272 
Formazioni Comuniste Armate (Armed Communist Formations) is also among the main 
organizations that swelled the ranks of the Red Brigades’ militants.  
The origin of the group can be traced to the dissolution of the Potere Operaio (Workers’ 
Power), a radical left-wing Italian political group, during the spring of 1973. The latter 
was split in several committees, the most remarkable of which was the Comitato 
Comunista di Centocelle (Centocelle Communist Committee), in the Roman District. 
Some militants belonging to this group, together with members from the other 
Communist Committees, decided to establish a clandestine organization active 
throughout the national territory: it was the constituent moment of the group in 1975.  
The group was the author of various attacks against diverse giants of the 
telecommunications field and oil sphere, as well. 
The Formazioni Comuniste Armate got in touch with the Red Brigades in the second 
half of 1975, when the latter established for the first time their new pillar in Rome. This 
was the starting point of the exodus from the group Formazioni Comuniste Armate: 
some of the militants founded new revolutionary groups, others like Valerio Morucci 
joined the Red Brigades. 
3.2.5 Brigate Rosse-BR 
The Red Brigades represented the foremost long-running Italian armed group, indeed it 
has been active for nearly twenty years ̶  from 1970 to 1988 ̶  although not with a unitary 
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history. It will be pointed out how the organization evolved in three different phases 
during its lifetime.   
Far from wanting to flatten the Italian terrorist scenario to a single armed organization, 
the Red Brigades had a crucial role in Italian history in those years labelled “years of 
lead”. The Kidnapping and murder they led against the President of Christian 
Democracy Aldo Moro showed Italy and the entire Europe how they could represent a 
direct danger for Italian State and its institutions. 
Their development as an organization has been gradual and went at the same pace of 
their selection of the target to be hit: at first, bombs attacks against factory facilities and 
goods owned by company managers; at a later time, individuals were victims of 
kidnappings and summary trials, conducted by the so called “people’s court”
273
. 
The goal of the original unit of the Red Brigades, according to their words, was the 
establishment of the Partito Armato del Proletariato (Armed Party of the Proletariat), the 
final fulfilment of the people’s will to power
274
. It was the response to the militarization 
of the State, to the suppression of the proletarian revolution, which was firmly hindered 
by the “Gaullist fascism” of the bourgeoisie, which had the appearance of a democracy, 
but actually it had already deployed its repressive army
275
. This manifesto was 
announced in a booklet appeared a year after the establishment of the Red Brigades, in 
September 1971. In this booklet they also recognized the revolutionary experience in 
metropolitan cities as the path to be taken in order to cope with the militarization of the 
bourgeoisie
276
, since  
the city is today the heart of the system, the organizing center of political and economic 
exploitation [...]. But it is also the weakest point of the system, where contradictions appear more 
acute [...]. it is here in his heart that the system must be hit.277 
Thus, according to their militants, the undertaking of a metropolitan guerrilla, which has 
to be led in line with the Marxist-Leninist ideology; nevertheless, as the journalist 
Giorgio Bocca noticed, their activity has to be connected to the war communism, the 
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same one that affected the main dictators-generals, like Stalin and Castro, instead of the 
Leninist style
278
. The latter, indeed, approved terrorism as a mean of fight, but it should 
be undertaken only at a certain point of the class conflict, not at the starting phase of the 
battle
279
. On the contrary, the Red Brigades exploited terrorism as a method of struggle 
from the beginning, stating that this was the only way to conduct politics in Italy
280
. 
Although militants payed specific attention to the needs of the working class ̶ from the 
occupation of the houses to the subscription of the means of transport to reach the 
workplace ̶ their real goal always came to light in their leaflets:  
We take by means of violence THE POWER: because only the logic of TAKE pays! […] But 
comrades, the struggle of the commuter proletariat [...] is only a moment of the assault on the 
power of the pigs, for a proletarian power that, alone, can satisfy our real interests281. 
An attack on the power, which gradually would increasingly correspond to an attack on 
the State. The previous excerpt belongs to an article appeared in the periodical Sinistra 
Proletaria (Proletarian Left), which at first was only the title of a periodical published 
by the Collettivo Politico Metropolitano (Metropolitan Political Organization) ̶ a left-
wing organization active in Milan since 1969 ̶ and then turned out to be the organization 
itself. The change in name had probably to do with the efforts the Collettivo Politico 
Metropolitano faced because of the presence in the city of other numerous left-wing 
organs characterized by a different stamp compared to the Collettivo Politico 
Metropolitano: organizations like Movimento Studentesco (Student Movement) and 
Avanguardia Operaia (Workers Avant-garde) driven by a revisionist hallmark, or Lotta 
Continua (Continuous Struggle) promoter of the Workerism theory
282
. Thus the problem 
was probably linked to the level of participation, i.e. the number of militants, which 
increased up to 150
283
. Moreover, a further transformation is recognisable in the 
conversion to the armed struggle
284
. In the periodicals appeared between July and 
August 1970 it is constantly mentioned the necessity for the proletarian left to organize 
itself into a group in order to lead its violence to the proletarian victory: ‘we have also 
                                                 
278
 Ibid., 37. 
279
 Bonanate, “Dimensioni Del Terrorismo Politico,” 117. 
280
 Bocca, Il Terrorismo Italiano 1970/1978, 36–37. 
281
 Sinistra Proletaria, Prendiamoci i trasporti, Foglio di Lotta February 1971cit. in Soccorso Rosso, 
“Brigate Rosse. Che Cosa Hanno Fatto, Che Cosa Hano Detto, Che Cosa Se Ne è Detto.” 
282
 Andrea Saccoman, “Le Origini Delle Brigate Rosse in Base a Nuove Acquisizioni Documentarie,” 







understood that it is not enough to make peaceful strikes, calm demonstrations [...]. 
Now we must understand that proletarian violence must be organized. Better than our 
class enemy’
285
. As a response to the need for a greater coordination and the will to 
pursue the revolutionary activity in secrecy, a new group was set up: the Red Brigades. 
A leaflet circulating in October 1970 announced the start of the Red Brigades activity: 
‘Red autumn has already begun. Examples are: […] the appearance of autonomous 
workers' organizations (Red Brigades) that represents the first moments of proletarian 
self-organization, aiming at confronting the bosses and their servants on their own turf 
"on an even footing’
286
. 
The organization that will become the Red Brigades was officially set up in the 
province of Reggio Emilia in August 1970 by eighty representatives of Sinistra 
Proletaria and Collettivo Politico Metropolitano
287
. The first group was made of some 
militants of the student movement belonging to the University of Trento ̶ among them, 
Curcio, Cagol and Semeria ̶ members of the Emilian FGCI (Italian Communist Youth 
Federation), that is Franceschini, Gallinari and Ognibene, together with some workers 
mainly belonging to the Sit-Siemens, among which Moretti stood out
288
. 
In this constant request for a coordination within the group, the Red Brigades chose to 
adopt a paramilitary structure that reminded that of a National Liberation Army
289
. 
Their conformation was the outcome of a response caused by the first setback they had 
to face: on 2 May 1972 the Italian Police, thanks to the statements of the justice 
collaborator Marco Pisetta, found the Milanese hideout of the Red Brigades and 
confiscated numerous important documents
290
. The bulk of the organization was 
arrested. Only ten of the “regular” militants were free, among them Franceschini, 
Moretti, Curcio and Cagol
291
. As a consequence of this attack, the group converted to 
the total illegality, which was considered the only effective way to fight the enemy in 
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. In this choice, the Red Brigades were informed by the 
Latin-American experience of the Tupamaros, a left-wing urban guerrilla group active 
in Uruguay in those years
293
. At the top of the organization, the Red Brigades conceived 
two organs, the Strategic Directorate and the Executive Committee, with managerial 
and administrative tasks, respectively
294
. The first was concerned with indicating the 
ideological guidelines and was made up of the members of the Executive Committee 
and representatives of each Fronts and Columns; the latter had various responsibility: 
first of all it made sure that the political guidelines of the Strategic Directorate were 
realized, secondly, it considered every projects coming from each Fronts, and finally it 
managed funds
295
. Directly depending on the Executive Committee although 
autonomous on the logistic field, the Column was the operating arm of the Red Brigades 
and carried out the actions approved by the Executive Committee
296
. The very local 
organ of the organization were the brigades, groups involved in collecting information 
about the chosen target
297
. A further structure’s unit was the Front, a section of the Red 
Brigades in charge of the conception and development of campaigns regarding a 
specific fields of the Italian Country
298
. Between the autumn 1973 and the spring 1974, 
the Front branched out into three sectors
299
: 
 the large factory sector (settore delle grandi fabbriche): involved in the 
conception of the factory struggles. The Milanese sector stood out between 
1973 and the beginning of 1974. The Nuclei Operai di Resistenza Armata 
(Workers Nuclei of Armed Resistance) ̶ NORA had short life but were 
effective in their actions
300
. 
 sector of the fight against counter-revolution (settore della lotta alla 
controrivoluzione): it organized campaigns against the State organs, which 
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hindered the revolutionary process, i.e. the police, the judiciary, the political 
parties considered enemies of the revolution. 
 the logistic sector: it handled and provided the means to be used during 
campaigns. 
In the wake of the uproars in the Italian prisons, a fourth fronts was launched: the 
Prisons Front, whose concern was leading the organization of the struggle against the 
prison system
301
, which was extremely severe, hierarchical even among prisoners, and 
corrupted. This activity was lead in cooperation with the Nuclei Armati Proletari
302
. 
The organization appeared well-structured with every branches in charge of specific 
aspects and with focused tasks. Probably, this was the secret of its long-life, but 
certainly it was the cause of the periodic disagreements inflaming the ranks of the 
group. During 1976, the organization’s structure underwent a further change, which 
signed the transition to the attack on “the heart of the State”: the large factory sector was 
included in the sector of the fight against counter-revolution
303
. 
As already said, the operations lead by the Red Brigades met two distinct phases: the 
first, coinciding with the beginning of their activity, mainly addressed to mangers of the 
main Italian factories ̶ Sit-Siemens, Pirelli, Alfa Romeo, FIAT ̶ or to union official, 
whereas the second period focused on hitting State personalities. Nonetheless, their 
actions were never detached from the national historical context. Their first kidnapping 
was at the expense of the Milanese Sit-Siemens’ manager Idalgo Macchiarini, on 3 
March 1972. In the leaflet following the kidnapping, he was accused of being a 
neofascist, oppressor of the workers there in the Sit-Siemens
304
. Opinions on this action 
were contrasting in the extralegal environment, whereas democratic parties wanted to 
distance themselves from this coercive method. The Communist Italian Party stated that 
this ‘phantom organization’ wanted to involve workers and trade unions in their actions, 
which had nothing to do with the labor movement, and foster the strategy of tension
305
. 
A year later, on 12 February 1973 in Turin, it was Bruno Labate’s turn, a union official 
of the CISNAL (General Labor Union) a trade union linked to the Movimento Sociale 
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Italiano (Italian Socialist Movement), a neo-fascist political party. The event was the 
outcome of a tense situation, created as a result of the negotiations for the contract for 
the metalworkers. In 1972, the fascist presence in the factories as well as in the outside 
world made its voice heard: it has the neo-fascist hallmark the bomb attack to trains 
carrying workers to Reggio Calabria, where a manifestation was organized by the trade 
unions in October 1972
306
. 1972 and 1973 were characterized by frequent turmoil 
within FIAT factory mainly due to the conflicts between red and fascist workers, the 
latter accused of being spies working for the “boss”
307
. Agnelli, for his part, carried out 
a redundancy policies against workers considered unruly
308
. Moreover, beyond Labate’s 
kidnapping there were doubts, raised by the left-wing, about an agreement between the 
FIAT and CISNAL, aiming at positioning people among the workers ranks in order to 
control and hinder the riots’ organisers
309
. The suspect were confirmed by the union 
official himself during the interrogatory led by the Red Brigades
310
. The same year, the 
Red Brigades will be the authors of two further kidnappings, which will involve Alfa 
Romeo’s manager Michele Mincuzzi in Milan and Ettore Amerio, FIAT chief of staff, 
in Turin. The first kidnapping occurred on 28 June 1973, in the aftermath of Andreotti’s 
resignation, which will have made a way for a centre-left government with Mariano 
Rumor as Prime Minister
311
. The kidnapping of the engineer Mincuzzi represented the 
first step of the fight against the Christian Democracy considered the safe house of the 
modern-years fascists, a fight inaugurated with the raid on the offices of the UCID, an 
apolitical organization gathering Christian entrepreneur and managers, occurred in 
January of the same year
312
. Amerio’s kidnapping was the continuation of the Labate’s, 
since the union official revealed that the chief of staff was in charge of the hiring of 
those people recommended by the CISNAL. Thus, it was an answer to both the 
widespread corruption in FIAT and the threat of the unemployment benefits exploited in 
the context of the negotiation for the company contract
313
. Moreover, in the leaflet 
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appeared the same day of the kidnapping, the Red Brigades stated the incompatibility of 
the armed fight with the “historic compromise”, the political alliance proposed by 
Berlinguer in the aftermath of the Chilean coup occurred in September 1973
314
. 
Probably, in that year, proletariat felt confused because of these political guidelines, to 
which it should be added the conference having as speakers Umberto Agnelli, FIAT 
manager and Giorgio Amendola, a member of the Communist Italian Party. The 
conference was held in Bologna in April of the same year and represented a moment of 




The starting point of the attack on the State coincides with the kidnapping of the 
magistrate Mario Sossi, Public Prosecutor in the trial of the “XXII October Group”, 
particularly severe against the left-wing organizations. The passage from the fabric to 
the State conflict occurred quite soon, that is a year later, in April 1974 and lasted, 
formally, till the kidnapping of the magistrate of the Ministry of Justice, Giovanni 
D’Urso in December 1980
316
.  The action against Sossi is to be placed in the frame of 
the abrogative referendum on the divorce law, which was the first sign of a shift to left 
of the electorate, a shift reinforced during the local and national election of 1975 and 
1976, respectively. In their view, the Red Brigades were acting as a response to the 
establishment of a “Neo-Gaullist Fascism”
317
. 
The Red Brigades’ actions would be tightened further after the arrest of the original unit 
of the organization and the fight would be harsher than ever, with numerous murders, 
till the sadly famous Moro case, which will be discussed in the last chapter.   
3.3  Political violence: an intertwined network 
Studying this decade, a question rouse spontaneously: how is it possible that political 
violence had such a spread? How can it be explained that much of this phenomenon was 
delimited to the domestic territories, despite of the clamour provoked by international 
terrorism, such as the Palestinian conflict? 
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Left-wing organizations with Marxist-Leninist background were the most active across 
the world, mainly because of the cultural legacy left by the cultural movement of the 
late 1960s
318
. The rising disillusionment towards the Soviet Union, responsible of the 
violent repression in Prague and within its territories, was combined with the 
disgruntlement caused by the failure of the Mao’s experiment and the atrocities 
committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia: the collapse of these experiences left the 
most extremist fringes of the late 1960s students movements without guide and 
control
319
. The Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany 
and the Action Directe in France were all representatives of the so called Red 
Terrorism, each endowed with peculiarities linked to their Countries. Simultaneously, 
there were groups committed to the nationalist cause as the IRA in the Northern Ireland 
and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, fighting for the independence of the 
Basque population. Left-wing terrorism was not the only example of political violence 




It was proved the link between these organizations ̶ also those belonging to the right 
wing ̶ and the Soviet Union. Since the early 1960s the KGB organized terrorism training 
courses in the Soviet territories and tried to took control over the existing extremist 
groups
321
. The Soviet Union’s aim was probably to destabilise Western Countries from 
the inside and prove the inefficiency of the capital system
322
. It was interesting to notice 
the network it succeeded to create. The Soviet Union firstly supported and then strongly 
relied on nationalist Palestinian groups as the link between Soviet Union and Marxist-
Leninist groups around the world: their role was to deliver the Soviet funds among 
those groups
323
. There are also evidence that witnessed how the Soviet Union charged 
the STASI ̶ the State Security Service of the German Democratic Republic ̶ with the 
task of training terrorist groups and as the General of the STASI stated among those 
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groups there were the Palestine Liberation Organization, the German RAF, the Irish 
IRA and the Basque ETA
324
. Italian groups maintained these kind of relationships as 
well and members of the Potere Operaio and the Red Brigades attended the summer 
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4 The outbreak of political violence: a British perspective 
The analysis carried out through the previous chapters is meant to provide an historical 
framework of Italy and Great Britain during the 1970s. Both countries were examined 
in their international context in the attempt to underline their relevance in the worldwide 
scene, despite of their perpetual condition as ‘sick men’. Their reputation as ‘sick’ 
countries was connected to their domestic problems concerning the economic and 
political landscape, which were characterized by a continuing instability on account of 
structural elements and unfortunate juncture as well. 
Uncertainty marked the endurance of the social fabric as well, from which internal 
subversive events arouse, threatening the safety of the country. It was mentioned in the 
third chapter how terrorism could take on different shapes depending on its target and 
its aim. Political reasons ̶ together with religious and ethnical causes ̶  justified the 
widespread violence so common in both the Western and the Eastern countries during 
the 1970s. Indeed, terrorism represented such a huge matter of concern to governments 
and citizens in the period between the end of the 1960s and the first half of the 1980s, 
that those years were labelled by some scholars as ‘the age of terrorism’
326
, with 
reference to the title of a work by Walter Laqueur
327
, one of the most prominent 
academics on this issue. 
As far as political violence is concerned, Italy represented a peculiar case among other 
European countries, since ‘no other industrial society in the world has experienced such 
a long, widespread, violent and well-established terrorism like the one experienced in 
Italy’
328
. However, it shall be bore in mind that the Italian terrorism of the 1970s had 
political origins, and that the previous statement kept out terrorism with nationalistic or 
religious aims ̶ like actions conducted by the IRA, the PLO or Islamist extremist groups ̶ 
which includes examples of a more long-running terrorist phenomenon. 
Hence, in this thesis work the attention is focused on political violence. Far from 
wanting to restrict the 1970s to the sole terrorist phenomenon, the latter actually played 
a fundamental role in the Italian history, ultimately succeeding in hitting the established 
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institutional power through the abduction and murder of the President of the Christian 
Democracy, Aldo Moro. 
The second issue to be clarified is the reason behind the choice of a British point of 
view about this matter. The second chapter attempted to show the importance Italy had 
on British foreign policy, particularly as far as European context was concerned. British 
diplomatic documents are rich of proof witnessing the key role Italy had on supporting 
Britain within the Community context. The Head of the Western European Department 
of the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO), David Gladstone, commented in a 
confidential documents of June 1979 that ‘[…] Italy [was] [their] major ally in [their] 
attempts to reform the EEC budget and the CAP and to bring about greater 
convergence’, thus confirming that ‘[…] the Italian dimension in [their] Community 
interests [had] grown significantly in recent months’. 
By virtue of the crucial part Italy had on negotiations regarding common political goals 
within the Community, HMG showed ‘[…] a lot of “instant” Ministerial curiosity about 
Italian politics’, which caused considerable concern not so much for the prospect of a 
Communist participation in the government as for the continuing general instability 
suffered by its governmental institutions and its society
329
.            
In this final chapter a close examination of British diplomatic documents and articles of 
the British press will show the interest in the Italian phenomenon of terrorism by HMG. 
Briefing notes on the diplomatic documents are required. They were gained from the 
website ‘Margaret Thatcher Foundation’
330
, a useful source that offers free access to 
numerous historical documents pertaining to the Thatcher period. Unfortunately, official 
reports uploaded to the website and pertaining to the theme of terrorism date back to 
after 1978, thus part of the first 1970s could not be reconstructed through diplomatic 
documents. It is also true that 1978 was the year that marked the turning point in the 
Italian history, in general, and in the fight against political violence in particular. From 
that year on, the interest of London in law and order in the Italian country sharply 
intensified. 
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It was attempted to fix this flaw in the paragraph titled ‘Political violence through the 
decade’, in which British newspaper articles on Italy were employed in order to provide 
an account of the terrorist phenomenon over the 1970s. 
The newspapers examined were ‘The Times’, ‘The Guardian’ and the weekly 
publication ‘The Observer’. The choice fell on them after an essay of Giovanna Farrell-
Vinay
331
, according to which ‘The Times’ and ‘The Guardian’ were the British 
newspaper that showed more interest in Italy during the 1970s.       
4.1  Italian terrorism through British diplomatic documents 
By the end of the examined decade, terrorism was a crucial matter to be tackled. Italy 
had already experienced the darkest event of its republican history with the murder of 
Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades in 1978, whereas Britain would suffer a terrorist attack 
by the IRA against Lord Mountbatten a year later, in which the British statesman would 
lose his life. The need of understanding this phenomenon was so pressing that a sub-
committee on terrorism was created during the Second Party Leaders Conference of the 
European Democrat Union in the aftermath of Lord Mountbatten’s murder. The sub-
committee had the task of analysing ‘[…] the phenomenon of terrorism, its basis and 
aspects’ not only ‘[…] in its narrow sense, but also with its sociological background, 
e.g. in respect to the development of the youth’. 
These guidelines can be traced in several records by the British Consulate General in 
Milan, going back to the Italian general elections in June 1979. These documents were 
the outcome of ‘[…] researches into the political and social attitudes in the north of 
Italy’
332
, primarily aiming at examining the work of local councils controlled by both 
Christian Democrats and Communists, in the attempt at understanding whether the 
‘historical compromise’ had any positive results at provincial and regional level. 
However, among questions relating to local and  national politics and the state of the 
city economy, law and order turned out to be an urgent issue. British diplomats’ concern 
over terrorism was expressed in their questions asked in each northern Italian cities they 
visited. Paul H. Scott, the Consul-General in Milan in the period from 1977 to 1980, 
collected the bulk of information relating to this matter and what came to light during 
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conversations with council representatives was the shared belief of the key role 
universities had as hotbed for terrorists recruitment and indoctrination. 
In a conversation with the Prefect of Pavia, Dr Vincenzo Vicari ̶ who ‘struck [the 
British diplomat] as one of the most intelligent and open-minded of Italian officials in 
[his] experience’
333
 ̶ Paul H. Scott reported Vicari’s analysis on crime and violence in 
Pavia. In the Prefect’s words, students in the city were ‘serious and hardworking and 
created no problems of law and order’. Nevertheless police should not let down its 
guard, because terrorists could take advantage of the city’s reputation and chose it as a 
base  ̶as it actually happened ̶ confident of the minimal supervision by authorities. The 
Council-General Scott came to the same conclusion with the Prefect of Ferrara on a visit 
paid by the British diplomat to the local official in June 1979. Although Ferrara was 
free from terrorism, the Prefect kept constantly on the alert the police, since terrorists 
could come in the city from the outside attracted by a likely lack of vigilance
334
. The 
reason behind the absence of any kind of terrorist activity in the city lay in the small 
realty of the University of Ferrara, which ‘was free from the problem of the larger 
universities such as Bologna’
335
. Despite of the non-violent hallmark of the cultural life 
in the city university, the high rate of unemployment among young people, seriously 
worried the local officials, who feared that the youngest part of the population could 
resort to political violence. This opinion was shared at national level as well. Indeed, 
once asked about the Italian situation during a phone call with the British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, the Italian President Sandro Pertini expressed his ‘two 
major preoccupation’, that is ‘unemployment and terrorism’, specifying that 
‘unemployment, especially amongst the young was a dangerous phenomenon in Italy’, 




Yet, unemployment was a problem concerning southern regions as well, but there the 
terrorist phenomenon did not take root, except for some sporadic events. Indeed, in 
some reports describing her diplomatic trip to the South of Italy, the British diplomat 
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Kathryn Colvin from the Atlantic Region Research Department pointed out that in 




4.2 Political violence: a North-South conflict related phenomenon? 
As far as the division North-South of the nation was concerned, British documents 
showed a close attention to the social conflict that was revealing its dramatic outcomes 
in those years. Although internal migration in Italy had not come to a standstill, it 
considerably slowed down by the mid-1970s
338
. Thus, the change occurred in Northern 
cities within the social fabric became evident at the end of the decade, uncovering a 
serious split between natives and Southern people, relating to both economy and 
culture. 
The British diplomat Paul H. Scott noted during his trip to the regions of Lombardy and 
Emilia-Romagna that the North and South issue was deeply rooted in the mind of Italian 
population. The Northern contempt for the regions in the South involved not only their 
people ̶ with Northern men and women complaining that ‘it was a disaster that most 
Italian emigrants living abroad came from the South and therefore gave a false and 
unfortunate impression of what Italians were really like’
339
 ̶ but the central government 
in Rome as well, giving ‘evidence of a dangerous irresponsibility’
340
. The British 
diplomat judged the nature of this conflict similar to a ‘Hitlerian racialism’, admitting 
that ‘it is a strong phrase but [he] chose it deliberately to attempt to convey the way in 
which people in the North [spoke] about the Southerners with disgust or contempt as 
though they were some sort of inferior species which was barely human’
341
. Some of the 
prejudices held by Italian Northerners against Southern people were regarded unfair by 
British officials, since most of the comments ̶ regarding, for instance, the squalor of the 
big cities as Milan and Turin ̶ had to be ascribed to the effects of the increasing 
industrialization affecting metropolises. 
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What is interesting herein is the debate, encouraged within the British embassy, on a 
likely correlation between the North-South issue and terrorism. This connection was 
suggested to Paul H. Scott by some talks he had with local officials working in the 
North of the country. In a visit he paid to the Prefect of Cremona Dr Michele Barile, the 
latter pointed out that ‘the disparities between the North and South were at the root of 
the problems of crime and subversion in Italy as a whole’
342
, adding that although some 
immigrants from the South had well adapted themselves to the city life, ‘many others 
had failed to do this’ revealing ‘a natural tendency for them to turn to crime or political 
violence’
343
. The British diplomatic service counted among its members some diplomats 
sharing the opinion of the Prefect of Cremona. Sir Ronald Arculus, Ambassador to Italy 
in the period between 1979 and 1983, seemed to agree with Dr Barile when he wrote 
that ‘in the primitive societies of the South of Italy and of the islands, Italian people 
have solved conflicts through violence rather than through law for a long time’
344
. Yet, 
on the other hand, the contrasting viewpoint expressed by the Prefect of Pavia saw the 
terrorist phenomenon as a ‘Northern and not a Southern practice’, acted by ‘well-
educated’ terrorists, grown-up with Catholic values and belonging to ‘a prosperous 
middle-class family’
345
. The British Consul-General Scott proved to be more prudent in 
judging the terrorist phenomenon, claiming that both of the standpoints ̶ the Prefect of 
Cremona’s and Pavia’s ̶ could be regarded reasonable. Nonetheless, he added that Dr 
Barile represented ‘the general Northern view’ fostered by Italian newspapers, which 
reported daily that ‘very many of the criminals, and especially the kidnappers (who 
[were] the most of the lot) [were] Southern criminals’
346
. According to Sir Alan C. 
Goodison, a British Minister in Italy from 1976 to 1980, a crucial distinction should be 
drawn considering the two points of view of the Prefects ̶ it was true that Northern cities 
had a high rate of crime, exacerbated by the Southern immigrant cause, but urban crime 
was a different phenomenon from political violence. Sir Goodison acknowledged that 
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the latter ‘[was] an essentially Northern phenomenon which [had] its roots in the major 
cities of the North and [had] spread from there southwards’
347
. 
Despite it was clear within the British embassy that the North-South conflict and every 
link made to connect it with the terrorist phenomenon was the output of deep-rooted and 
unfair prejudices, the tone of denigration adopted by Northerners towards Southern 
people still baffled the British diplomatic corps. The Consul-General Scott expressed 
his puzzlement to his colleagues, wondering how was it possible that Southerners could 
contain their resentment at such comments, ‘unless this [was] indeed one of the 




4.3 International links 
Through the study of the available documents, it was possible to notice that already by 
1975 the British government had suspicion that links connecting terrorist organizations 
all over the world existed. Those links involved not only groups operating at 
transnational level ̶ such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, for example ̶ but also 
terrorist organs active nationally, thus creating a network aiming at offering logistical 
help. 
By the mid-1970s international connections between terrorist organizations were not 
seriously considered and it would take time, precisely the outset of the 1980s, to be 
properly and publicly debated. It is indicative of this scepticism the speech Lord 
Chalfont, a life peer, held to the House of Lords in February 1975. Worried about the 
growing phenomenon of subversion and left-wing extremism in the UK, Lord Chalfont 
pointed out several points, among which the ‘very wide network of links between 
international terrorist organizations’
349
. Although the name of the Red Brigades or other 
Italian subversive groups was never put forward he made clear references to links 
involving the IRA and other British ‘home-grown revolutionary organizations’ with the 
PLO and the German RAF, with whom Italy’s extremists were in contact. A 
contribution to support Lord Chalfont’s thesis was given by Lord Gore-Booth, who 
reminded the Lords in the assembly that only two years earlier it was found that the 
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guilty parties for the attack to the Tel Aviv airport were Puerto Ricans and that ‘it 
happened in Israel, it was performed by Japanese who had obtained false documents in 
Germany and Czechoslovak weapons in Italy’
350
.  
Yet, three years later during a debate about terrorist organizations and the ratification of 
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism held in the House of 
Commons, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr Roy Mason, firmly stated 
that ‘although contacts [might] be made, they [were] not of any significance’
351
. 
However, only a week later, on 22 May 1978, Lord Chalfont warned again the House of 
Lords against the ‘widespread and growing network of international terrorism, that 
[was] highly organized and [was] recruited in many nations of the world’
352
. Moreover, 
referring to the military training terrorists used to receive abroad, he mentioned the 
recent event occurred in Italy, putting forward the hypothesis that terrorists that attacked 
and murdered Aldo Moro could have been trained in East European and other 
Communist countries. The theory of a structured terrorist network took some years to 
become established within the British Houses of Commons and Lords. During a debate 
in the House of Lords, the life peer Lord Weidenfeld asserted that ‘there [was] scarcely 
a subversive political group of importance operating in the world that at one time or 
other did not pass through one of the PLO's farflung training camps’ adding that there 
were ‘proven links with the IRA, the Baader Meinhof, the Red Army Brigade in Italy, 
their namesakes in Japan, the Polisarios of the Sahara, terrorists of El Salvador and the 
Monteneros of Argentina’, identifying their common feature in the ‘total rejection of 
Israel’s right to live’
353
. The terrorist phenomenon was thus conceived as a ‘rapid 
growth industry’, involving terrorist organizations ‘cooperat[ing] on money, weapons, 
training, tactics, refuges and intelligence’
354
. As far as Italy was concerned, the 
President of the Italian Republic Sandro Pertini revealed to the neo-elected British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that according to him, Italian terrorism ‘[was] being 
controlled from headquarters outside Italy’, adding that the country was chosen as a 
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target because of its strategic position in the Mediterranean Sea, facing Africa and the 
Middle-East
355
. However Italy had no proof to support such a statement.    
In the aftermath of Aldo Moro’s murder, it was observed by Lord Chalfont that the 
terrorist ‘rapid growth industry’ had always had as main targets ‘the countries of the 
Western democratic world’
356
. Though, it took some time to make a further step and to 
identify the assumed guilty party of a such widespread phenomenon. It was again Lord 
Chalfont, who denounced in a committed speech at the House of Lords the alleged 
culprit of the ‘international league of terror’ stating
357
: 
At the centre of this network—and I have said this before in your Lordships' House and say it 
again now—is the Soviet Union, which, usually through the medium of its clients in the Middle 
East, provides the training and the finance. It is now fully documented that until the Israeli 
invasion of the Lebanon, the PLO were being trained in more than 50 camps in the Communist 
bloc, 40 of them in the Soviet Union itself. The links between the PLO and the Baader Meinhof 
group in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Basque separatists in Spain and the other 
terrorist organisations of the world are now so fully documented that no one any longer even 
bothers to discuss them or deny them. 
Thus, the so called red network theory
358
, holding that behind the ‘low intensity warfare 
against the West’
359
 stood the Soviet Union, started to be regarded reliable since the 
beginning of the new decade. 
4.4 Terrorism and the Italian political-social background in the aftermath 
of Aldo Moro’s Murder 
The abduction and following murder of the President of the Christian Democracy 
represented the peak of the terrorist campaign conducted by the Red Brigades. It 
shocked the Italian population, the Italian parties and the entire Western world not only 
for the guerrilla scenes occurred in a central area of the capital city of a Western 
democratic state, but also for the subject involved. Aldo Moro had taken up different 
offices for an uninterrupted period, starting as a Minister of Justice in the second half of 
the 1950s, running diverse ministries over a period of twenty years, serving as Prime 
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Minister for more than six years and at the time
360
, not only the President of the 
governing party but also the favourite to be appointed President of the Italian Republic.    
Since from the outset of the incident, London expressed its solidarity towards the Italian 
government and Moro’s family. The conservative party’s leader, Margaret Thatcher ̶ 
who just nine months earlier had invited the Christian Democratic President in order to 
foster closer relations between their two parties
361
 ̶ sent a telegram to the Italian Prime 
Minister, Giulio Andreotti, conveying her and other Conservative members’ shock ‘to 
hear today’s terrible events in which Signor Moro was abducted and his brave 
bodyguards were murdered’
362
. Distress over the Moro’s affair was showed at European 
level as well. The British Prime Minister James Callaghan reported during a session at 
the House of Commons that, in light of the Moro’s abduction, ‘there was agreement on 
the need for close co-operation among the Nine in countering terrorism and to reach 
conclusions on the proposals put forward by President Giscard with the aim of 
improving judicial co-operation among the member countries’
363
. Unfortunately, only a 
single agreement was signed a year later by the Ministers of Justice of the nine Member 
States regarding the Application of the European Convention on the Suppression of 




Beyond the international implications, which are not part of this thesis work, the Moro’s 
abduction and murder and the terrorist phenomenon overall turned out to be a key 
factor, through which London carried out the analysis of the Italian political and social 
context near the end of the decade. 
Moro’s killing provoked the immediate reaction of the British Parliament, which 
through the words of the Conservative Party’s leader Margaret Thatcher not only 
expressed its sympathy but also showed its ‘understanding of the very difficult 
decisions that faced his [Moro’s] colleagues during what [had] also to have been a great 
ordeal for them’
365
. The British Prime Minister Callaghan also shared Thatcher’s words, 
stating: ‘I hope that any British Government would face such a situation with the same 
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courage as the Italian Government have done’
366
. Those praises referred to the hard-line 
Rome took over terrorists’ ransom note, and thus its decision not to negotiate with the 
Red Brigades ̶ who had demanded the release of Communist prisoners
367
. Thus, the 
British Parliament looked up to the firm stance the Italian government had towards 
terrorists’ demands, but at the same time it admired the strength it showed in making the 
civil choice to refuse to reintroduce the capital punishment as a special measure
368
 ̶ a 
proposal advanced by the President of the Italian Republican Party, Ugo La Malfa
369
, 
and demanded out loud by Giorgio Almirante, the Secretary of the Italian Social 
Movement
370
. Italy would be looked up to as an example of democratic resistance, when 
emergencies provisions would be discussed at the British House of Commons in 
relation to the Provisional IRA’s increasing activity and the demand for capital 
punishment by some Irish Unionists
371
. 
Aside from such a radical provision as the capital punishment, the British Embassy in 
Rome noted that the Italian political parties ‘were reconciled to the adoption of at least 
some of the measures necessary to combat terrorism’
372
. In his detailed analysis of the 
two consecutive governments headed by Andreotti ̶  the first formed on March 1978, 
whereas the second a year later ̶ the British diplomat Alan Campbell reported that 
terrorism initially worked as a glue for the Parliamentary majority, which ‘apart some 
wavering by the Socialists, stood firmly behind the government in the face of terrorist 
blackmail during the Moro affair’
373
. 
This kind of approving comments on the Italian political situation at the end of the 
decade should not be misleading. Indeed, by the accounts of the British ambassador, it 
proved to be clear to Campbell that terrorism was such a weak reason to keep a 
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parliamentary majority cohesive. Indeed, although political and economic conditions of 
the Andreotti’s fourth government were judged to be ‘not bad by Italian standards’, it 
was noticed that ‘the most fundamental questions of economic reform, e.g. the 
curtailment of public expenditure and wage inflation, remain unsolved’
374
. Economic 
causes would be indeed the main pretext for the fourth Andreotti’s government crisis 
and eventual fall. As it was showed in the first chapter, Italy’s membership of the 
European Monetary System meant the return of the Communists in opposition and 
again,  it would be the Italian Communist Party to cause the downfall of the fifth 
Andreotti’s government. According to the British embassy’s interpretation, such a 
Communist stance was due to the lack of consensus suffered by the Italian Communist 
Party because of its taking part to a Christian Democracy-led government without 
holding governmental position
375
, as it was originally envisaged by the ‘historic 
compromise’. However, as pointed out by Campbell in his Annual Review of 1978, one 
of the major consequence of Moro’s death was the failure of such an agreement to be 
honoured. The British ambassador’s analysis proved to be accurate and correct
376
: 
The Communists (PCI) for their part derived little benefit and some disadvantage from both of 
these events. Moro had been the architect of the elaborate structure of the present political 
framework which enabled them last March to take a small step forward towards their goal of 
participation in Government. Even if Moro in fact gave away very little and may be seen in a 
sense to have outwitted them, he was still the Communists’ preferred interlocutor and they must 
regard his disappearance as a set-back to their ambitions. 
From the description above, a further point comes to light, that is the perception by the 
British officials that the ‘historic compromise’ was actually a strategy conceived by the 
President of the Christian Democracy in order to solve the Italian crisis due to economic 
problems such as the inflation, and calm down the resulting turmoil caused by trade 
unions’ protests and student agitations
377
. As reported by several British accounts, its 
failure and the consequent return to opposition benches by the Communists, was seen 
through two opposite viewpoint by some Italian local officials: as a threat to law and 
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However, once Aldo Moro disappeared from the political scene, the Italian Communists 
could not find any available counterpart with whom discuss, since significant changes 
occurred within the Christian Democratic Party. Benigno Zaccagnini, the political 
secretary of the Christian Democracy as well as the moral heir of Aldo Moro, was 
broadly judged to be like an ‘orphan’. Since Moro’s death, he remained the only 
representative of a leftist political line, doomed to failure in the party congress in 1980, 
when Flaminio Piccoli, a moderate exponent, was appointed secretary of the Christian 
Democracy. 
With regards to Christian democratic members, British documents offered positive 
accounts of two Prime Ministers, i.e. Giulio Andreotti and Francesco Cossiga. As far as 
the latter is concerned, the diplomat Alan Goodison provided the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office with a brief account of his persona on the occasion of his 
appointment as Prime Minister on August 1979, in the aftermath of the fifth Andreotti’s 
government. In Goodison’s report, the period in which Cossiga held the office as 
Interior Minister, co-operation between London and Rome on security matter received a 
considerable boost. Although the ending of the Moro’s case represented a serious blot 
on his ministerial actions, his resignation in the aftermath of Moro’s death made him 
earn the reputation of ‘a minister who was prepared to take responsibility for the 
shortcomings of his subordinates’
379
. Furthermore, Goodison pointed out that during his 
office as Minister of the Interior, Cossiga ‘showed himself well disposed towards 
Britain, and Anglo/Italian co-operation in the security field was close’; this stance won 
him the trust of British official, who wrote: ‘Despite his comparative lack of 
international and European experience, he could prove to be a good choice of Prime 
Minister both from Italy’s and the UK’s point of view’
380
. 
Even more enthusiastic were the reports regarding Giulio Andreotti, ‘the cleverest and 
coolest political leader in Italy today. A man of government rather than of the Christian 
Democrat Party machine’
381
 who had served as a minister of several key ministries 
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since the middle-1950s and was leading the government during the Moro’s affair. 
Already at the end of 1978, Alan Campbell pointed out
382
:  
The politician who seems subsequently to have emerged most strongly in the course of the year, 
partly owing to Moro’s disappearance and partly because his Government has been relatively 
effective, is Andreotti. 
London was so much struck by the way Andreotti faced the abduction and killing of the 
President of the Christian Democracy that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in 
giving information serving for a meeting between Andreotti and Thatcher, wrote: 
‘Signor Andreotti won justifiable praise for his calm and courageous handling of the 
Moro kidnapping and murder’
383
. However, British esteem for Andreotti did not only 
regard the way he handled the emergency, but also his lead of ‘governments which have 
done unexpectedly well’, for a total period of a whole legislation ̶ a record, it is pointed 
out by Campbell, only held by Alcide De Gasperi in the post-war Italy
384
. Among 
political measures adopted by the fourth Andreotti’s government, it was mentioned the 
divisive bill to legalise the abortion, whereas economic provisions were highly praised, 
although many of them were judged to be ‘doubtfully workable’ or too much expensive, 
such as the establishment of a national health service or the legislation on the financial 
restructuring of industry
385
. The Pandolfi Plan, a three-year economic plan envisaging 
the containment of public spending and moderation in the growth of wage costs, was 
welcomed by the British embassy in Rome as the last achievement of the national unity 
government led by Andreotti. No further structural reforms, such as the crucial bill on 
reform of pensions, could be pushed through, since the Communists would cause the 
collapse of the grand coalition, through their withdrawal from the government majority, 
at the beginning of 1979. It was the end of the remarkable national unity government 
led by Andreotti, characterized by ‘his skilful management of parliamentary alliances, 
involving the support of the Italian Communist Party, without making serious 
concession to the latter’
386
. 
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The last prominent personality standing out in British diplomatic documents is Sandro 
Pertini, who was elected President of the Italian Republic in the aftermath of what was 
labelled by Campbell ‘a paltry affair’ compared to the Moro’s case
387
, i.e. the premature 
resignation of the Christian Democrat Giovanni Leone ̶ who was forced to stand down 
as head of state owing to allegations against him about Lockheed scandal. The election 
of President Pertini was immediately recognised by London as a sign of the political 
evolution of the Italian Socialist Party under Bettino Craxi’s leadership, which had 
showed an impressive increase in its numbers on the occasion of the administrative 
elections in May 1978. Beyond Pertini’s membership, British diplomats regarded the 
new-elected President of the Italian Republic ‘an evidently admirable man’
388
, and 
probably they shared the same opinion of their American colleague Richard Gardner, 
when he described Pertini’s career to be like that of a character of Alexander Dumas’s 
novels
389
. Pertini’s past life ̶ featuring frequent arrests and escapes from the Fascists and 
Nazis as well as a strong fight against the Fascism ̶ was undoubtedly regarded 
remarkable, but what foreign observers considered fundamental was his ultimate 
adherence to the Atlantic Pact, in spite of his initial pacifism and neutralism, together 
with a change of attitude towards the Communists, which had been seen as possible ally 
for years, but then were replaced with the support of a centre-left coalition
390
. 
Since Pertini’s election, British comments on his office were passionate, always 
praising his performance as ‘one of the bright feature of the political scene’
391
, not only 
for succeeding in dealing with the recurring political crises ̶ already six months after his 
assignment, the Communists toppled the Government ̶ but also for representing a 
respected figure of authority, calling for a change in the political classes and an hard-
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4.4.1 Conclusive observations: the inefficiency of the Italian military forces and justice 
Terrorism proved to be a profitable reason for bolstering cooperation between Italy and 
Great Britain. The latter had already great experience in the field, because of the long-
time activity of the Irish Republican Army, the irredentist paramilitary group based in 
Ireland. 
   Great Britain was among the NATO allies, which were asked for military assistance 
during the Moro’s kidnapping, since it was believed that the terrorists responsible for 
the abduction of the Christian Democracy’s President had received help from the 
outside
393
. For this reason, high-professional specialists coming from West Germany 
and Britain were deployed during the research activities of Mr Moro firstly, and his 
killers later. As far as West Germany was concerned, its assistance consisted in thirty-
two members of the German police belonging to the squad, which was searching for the 
killers of Hans Martin Schleyer, the President of the German employer’s association 
killed by the RAF in October 1977, five months earlier than the Italian events
394
. 
Whilst, the significant contribution of London was the visit of two men of the British 
SAS ̶ a special forces corps specialized in counter-terrorism and hostage rescue ̶ in 




The involvement of other nations in the Italian security matter was fundamental, since, 
as it emerged from the British documents and press articles, Italian military forces 
proved to be uncoordinated and thus inefficient
396
. According to the British newspaper 
‘The Observer’, this was due to ‘the overlapping of functions and rivalries between the 
nationally organised Carabinieri, the local traffic police run by the Interior Ministry and 
the various Secret Service agencies’
397
. In the column of ‘The Times’, Lord Chalfont 
uttered harsh words when he described the Italian police, which was judged 
‘demoralized and ineffective’, susceptible to likely infiltration by the terrorists
398
. 
According to Lord Chalfont, improvement of the poor conditions in which the Italian 
military force worked could not be carried out because of the opposition of the Leftist 
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, whose demand that the police forces had to be unionised into the Communist 
linked trade union CGIL (the Italian General Confederation of Labour) caused frictions 
between the two main governmental parties. 
On this purpose, both the British press and diplomats observed that the legacy of 
Fascism played the role of ‘bogyman’ in the country, hampering any proposal of reform 
regarded by the Left as ‘a potentially dangerous step back down the road to terrorism’
400
 
consequently making the authorities afraid of being accused of authoritarianism
401
.    
Once again, Italy was taken as an example ̶ not to follow, though ̶ of the need for an 
improvement in conditions of the police forces, if considerable achievements in 
contrasting terrorism wanted to be reached. From the benches of the British House of 
Lords, in a significant speech about the adoption of the Internationally Protected 
Persons Bill, the Baroness Diana Elles underlined the vicious cycle the Italian police 
was going through because of the attacks carried out by the press, debating
402
:  
I should like, if I may, to spend just one minute on what has been happening in Italy, as the noble 
Lord so rightly reminded us. There was a very important article in an Italian newspaper about a 
year ago, referring to the unfair and deprecatory attacks on the police force in the Press, in the 
media, by demonstrations, by word of mouth and by leaflets over five years. There was a 
crescendo of these attacks until about two years ago. There was a graph plotted of the number of 
attacks on the police on television and in broadcasts. I mention this advisedly, because we have 
recently suffered the same thing—a very unfair attack on the police made on television, which is 
perhaps just a warning shot across our bows. This series of attacks against the police went in a 
crescendo until about two or three years ago, when they suddenly descended. It was perfectly 
clear why they had descended—because the police in Italy had become demoralised, they had 
become inefficient and they had been subverted. To my mind, this was a very serious lesson to 
Western democratic States that if we sign these Conventions and if we undertake to protect not 
only our own citizens but internationally protected persons, we must see that our police forces 
are adequate for the task. 
An unfair attack on police was just the criticism directed to Lord Chalfont’s editorial by 
Peter Partner. The British historian wrote a complaining letter to ‘The Times’, 
commenting that the level of the article was close to the ‘took-Mussolini-to-make-the-
Italian-trains-run-on-time sort’. He went on affirming: 
Italian police organization certainly needs reform ̶ did the Germans have better luck with major 
political kidnappings? ̶ but I think that many who know Italy well would agree that the Italian 
Carabinieri are a serious body of men actuated by a high sense of duty. The kind of knocking 
treatment Lord Chalfont administers to them, combined with his suggestion that Italy is a “soft 
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touch” for terrorists, amounts to prejudiced disparagement of a great civilized country ̶ a country 
which also happens to be out NATO ally
403
. 
These kind of remarks, however, did not represent the general opinion about Italy and 
its institutions  ̶ in fact, the bulk of the readers of ‘The Time’ showed appreciation for 
Lord Chalfont’s editorial, albeit all of them distanced themselves from the call for 
ruthlessness from the Government
404
. 
Unfavourable comments did not spare the Italian justice, as well. In a British report 
describing the elections background in Italy in 1979, an article of the prominent Italian 
newspaper ‘Corriere della Sera’ was quoted, regarding the numerous problems afflicting 
the country. Conditions concerning the administration of justice were among the issues 
listed by the newspaper and they were considered ‘dramatic’, since ‘many crimes, 
among which [were] acts of corruption and violence remain[ed] unpunished. Thousands 
of criminals beginning with innumerable terrorists […] ha[d] been released from prison 
because of State’s inability to bring them to trial’
405
. 
On the other hand, by reading the British newspapers, people from Great Britain were 
informed that trials against the Red Brigades were constantly delayed because of the 
inability of the Italian justice to provide defence lawyers and people of the jury service 
with security against the Red Brigades’ threats and retaliation. After the murder of the 
chairman of the Turin Bar Association ̶ Fulvio Croce, who accepted the office of Court-
appointed counsel ̶ the journalist of The Observer, David Willey, wondered ‘how this 
tiny group of political fanatics was managing to frustrate the course of justice’
406
. ‘The 
Times’ correspondent Peter Nichols, commenting the opening of the trial against the 
Red Brigades in the eve of Moro’s kidnapping, wrote: 
Tomorrow is the third attempt and much more of a trial is at stake. The court of assizes has to 
show that Italian justice can bring allegedly dangerous terrorists to trial despite the atmosphere 
of fear they have created by the kidnappings, murders and woundings with which they are 
charged or for which they claim responsibility
407
.    
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4.5 Political violence through the decade 
The narration of the Italian terrorist phenomenon through the British eyes significantly 
changed throughout the decade, switching between protagonists, alternating between 
worrying and restrained tone, though never losing the distinguishing British humour, 
not even in the diplomatic documents. 
As far as the protagonists are concerned, it is possible to notice that in the British 
newspaper articles appeared in the first half of the 1970s, right-wing extremist groups 
prevailed over the left-wing extremists, i.e. news about law and order in Italy reported 
an increase in violence by neo-fascist organizations. Already in 1971, the Londoner 
‘The Guardian’ informed its readers that a wave of violence having neo-fascist 
hallmarks was sweeping over Italy. However, the newspaper clarified in many articles 
the Italian Government’s will to consider and treat the right-wing and left-wing violence 
in the same way
408
. 
In the reports of the British press, the Italian Social Movement of Giorgio Almirante 
was regarded responsible for the outbreak of political violence, which was supposed to 
create serious disorder, in order that his party could base its successful election 
campaign for 1972 national election on the restoration of law and order in Italy
409
. 
Actually, according to the comments appeared on ‘The Guardian’ about the trial for 
alleged Fascism involving Almirante’s party, the climate of tension characterizing Italy 
in the first half of the 1970s was due to the right-wing extremists linked to the Italian 
Social Movement
410
. A similar analysis was given by ‘The Times’, which argued that 
the social turmoil caused by neo-fascists was to be ascribed to the fact that Fascism was 
forbidden under the Constitution. The British newspaper went on specifying that: 
‘Fascism has only limited appeal except when public confidence in the social and 
political order is undermined. This is why it uses violence to undermine confidence. 
This is also why it is felt to be a danger in Italy today’
411
. 
However, the spreading violence across the country was originally seen by London 
more as an output of political tension between the left-wing groups and the right-wing 
movements than an actual attempt at overthrowing the Italian political system. Indeed, 
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although the alarming news coming from Italy, a coup d’état was considered 
‘improbable’ by British newspaper correspondents, since ‘there [were] just not enough 
people anxious to put their fingers on the trigger’
412
. 
However, right-wing thuggish activities kept on being reported as ‘the main concern of 
Italy’s political leaders’
413
 until 1976. The reports on this matter given by ‘The 
Guardian’ used to highlight the violence perpetrated by the neo-fascists by making 
leftist groups appear victims of their bomb attacks and clashes
414
. The accounts 
provided by ‘The Times’, on the contrary, appeared more neutral and described the 




During the general elections held in 1976, political violence ̶ which, actually, never 
faded from the news about Italy given by the British correspondents ̶ was feared to erupt 
again. 1976 could be probably recognized as the turning point in the narration of 
political tension. From this year, articles on turmoil affecting the Italian country 
appearing in the UK’s newspapers gradually underwent a change in protagonists. The 
plausible reason explaining this shift could be linked to the arrest of Renato Curcio, Red 
Brigades’ founder
417
 and the consequences it brought in the establishment of a new 
leadership ̶ assumed, from then on, by Mario Moretti. 
It is significant that, in January 1977, an article by ‘The Times’ informed that, in the 
previous year, ‘Political Crimes doubled in Italy’
418
 compared to 1975 ̶ in 1976 offences 
related to political tension were estimated at 1.198 cases and for 95 of them the Red 
Brigades were blamed. The earliest mention of the group by British newspapers dates 
back to Giangiacomo Feltrinelli’s death in 1972, when the police uncovered links 
connecting Feltrinelli’s organization, the Groups of Partisan Action, and ‘another 
terrorist left-wing organization called Red Brigade’
419
. Already at that time, Red 
Brigades’ aim to ‘carry out urban guerrilla warfare in Milan, capture leading public 
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figures and put them on trial’
420
 was a well-known fact. Nonetheless, when it happened 
the most crucial event in the history of modern Italy, both the Italian public opinion and 
British observers felt shocked at the news. 
Moro’s abduction and murder could be considered the climax of the terrorist 
phenomenon and a turning point in the Italian political scene, as already shown in the 
previous paragraph, but also the event that drove the society not to back the Red 
Brigades up anymore. The British press, however, gave reports about the general feeling 
widespread among the Italian population already before the Christian Democrat 
President’s kidnapping  ̶ at this point, the people of Italy felt exhausted from a 
phenomenon which ‘[…] has gone on too long while seemingly lacking either a specific 
aim or an idea’
421
. Nonetheless, because of the traditional indifference of the Italians 
towards  ̶ actually, a real approval for ̶ the Red Brigades and the other leftist groups, 
there were observers like Lord Chalfont, who feared that the public opinion would react 
apathetically even to the most violent act. The British politician, commenting the death 
of Aldo Moro, wrote in the column of ‘The Times’: ‘The real danger is not that Italy 
and the rest of the world will be devastated by the death of Moro, but rather that, after a 




As regards Moro’s kidnap, the British press dealt thoroughly with the theme, linking the 
dramatic event with the trial taking place in Turin and involving the Red Brigades’ 
founders. ‘The Times’ journalist Caroline Moorehead highlighted that the kidnap of 
Moro might be ‘a final bid to free the accused’
423
. 
All the three newspapers consulted during this work showed to have understood the 
gravity of the episode, comparing it with the attempted assassination in Rome of the late 
Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti
424
, or simply acknowledging that ‘the kidnapping 
of Aldo Moro, Italy’s leading politician, [was] an event of enormous political 
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significance, not just another in a long catalogue of spectacular bloody crimes. It was a 
deliberately calculated blow struck at the State itself’
425
. 
Despite the recognized seriousness of the happening, British journalists noticed that the 
Italian press was underestimating the Red Brigades, branding its rhetoric as ‘delirious’ 
and ‘raving’, clashing with the Government’s concern
426
. The latter had indeed created a 
special task force made up of political scientists, sociologists and psychologists for the 
purpose of analysing Red Brigades’ propaganda and Moro’s pleas for release
427
. The 
latter, on the other hand, represented an important issue of the incidents. Christian 
Democratic President’s demands for negotiations with the Red Brigades’ members were 
not taken seriously, since they were thought to be extorted from Moro through violence 
or by the means of drugs
428
. Hence, the Government’s decision to maintain the so called 
‘hard-line’ and not to give in to the group’s blackmail. 
Among the voices that stood up against the former Prime Minister’s abduction, there 
was also the voice of the Italian Mafia, which ̶ as reported by ‘The Guardian’ ̶ made 
death threats against the kidnappers. Actually, those threats were far away to be an 
official stance against the Red Brigades, rather an attempt at safeguarding Mafia’s 




The voice of the Italian Communist Party against the organized group, however, was the 
most unexpected, probably also because of its firmness on the decision not to give in to 
Red Brigades’ blackmail. As an example, it was put forward by the Communists the 
proposal of giving special powers to the Italian Interior Minister, Mr. Cossiga, to 
coordinate all the three police forces
430
. According to the British analysts, the 
Communist behaviour was a way to publicly distance themselves from a group, which 
claimed having their roots in the Marxism-Leninism and thus making the public opinion 
believe that the Red Brigades and Communism were closely related. 
Actually, as it was noticed by ‘The Guardian’, the Red Brigades strongly despised the 
Italian Communist Party ̶ guilty of having ‘deny[ed] Marxism-Leninism and betray[ed] 
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the goals of the workers’ ̶ along with the Spanish and French Communists
431
. 
Nonetheless, such a despise was due to a bitter disappointment felt by former 
committed Communists. An article appeared in ‘The Guardian’ noticed that many of the 
group’s leaders, such as Renato Curcio, had belonged to the Communist Party before 
Berlinguer’s ‘historic compromise’. It kept on pinpointing that  
many Red Brigades leaders were products of the unrest of the late 1960s, when radical students 
clashed with security forces on campus throughout Italy. […] Other members were the product 
of ‘study groups’ created in many of the foreign and Italian multi-national companies based in 
Northern Italy, like IBM, Siemens and Olivetti
432
. 
In a further analysis on the terrorist phenomenon, the journalist of ‘The Times’ Peter 
Nichols, transcending the specific features of the Red Brigades, outlined three essential 
prerequisites existing in the country for explaining such a phenomenon
433
. First of all, a 
wide-spread theory according to which all the three nations on the losing side of the 
World War II experienced a fast change in their political system together with a 
remarkable industrial expansion and social transformation. Secondly, to these 
significant changes, improvements in institutions did not follow leaving the state 
apparatus muddled. The last feature pinpointed by the journalist was the Christian 
democratic monopoly of the power, which prevented the nation from having a natural 
turnover of parties in office in governmental position, i.e. from having an essential 
feature of a healthy democracy. 
In their mind, the Red Brigades wanted to hit this kind of democracy, replacing it with a 
dictatorship of the proletariat. ‘The attack at the heart of the State’, the decisive step 
towards this achievement, was the murder of the alleged responsible for thirty years of a 
Government slave to the imperialist USA. 
As showed in the previous paragraph, the assassination of Aldo Moro shocked the entire 
Western world. Leaving out some speculations fuelled by Lord Chalfont ̶ who 
commented that Moro’s murder was felt shocking only within ‘the political 
establishment’, leaving the rest of Italy indifferent
434
 ̶ what emerged from both British 
article and diplomatic reports was the great resilience demonstrated by the Italian 
nation. 
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An article appeared in ‘The Guardian’ praised the courage of the State, although weak 
and further weakened by the fifty-five days, of not surrendering to the threat of 
terrorism and defending the democratic values even in such a dramatic experience
435
. 
The Red Brigades’ move, on the other hand, was regarded a ‘political decision’, which 
actually turned to be a ‘mistake in favour of the Italian state’
436
. In his analysis of the 
events, the Israeli diplomat and journalist Dan V. Segre highlighted that Moro’s 
abduction and murder was originally meant to divide ‘the Christian-Communist 
parliamentary alliance’, yet they failed, producing the opposite effect. Secondly, he 
noticed that the Red Brigades did not profit from the former Prime Minister’s death, on 
the contrary it only offered the Christian Democrats a martyr to exploit in the future 
elections. The likely reason for killing Aldo Moro would have been the fact that he got 
in touch with members so high up in the group hierarchy that letting him free would 
have represented a danger for the Red Brigades itself. Hence, the journalist drew the 
conclusions they had to  be ‘a very small organization probably not more than 300 
activists, with a large, mostly passive body of supporters, but without sufficient 




The British correspondent George Armstrong arrived to the same conclusion. Starting 
from a statement of the Red Brigades ̶ according to which they ‘did want to create bands 
of samurai, isolated from politics and political supports’ ̶ the journalist come to the 
conclusion that their indifference to involving population in their battle made them 




Nonetheless, the life of the Italian nation had to change and  the way it would react to 
this bowl was the greatest concern not only to Italy. Peter Nichols made a 
comprehensive analysis of the Italian political scene just in the aftermath of Moro’s 
finding
439
. The British journalist recognized ‘the apparent stupidity of providing the 
Christian Democrats with a heroic martyr’ ̶ yet, the Red Brigades probably took in 
                                                 
435
 George Armstrong, “Italy After the Moro Nightmare,” The Guardian, May 10, 1978, 12. 
436




 George Armstrong, “Italy After the Moro Nightmare,” 12. 
439




consideration this chance, but acted however in order to strike the Christian 
Democratic-Communist alliance, regarded the main target of the organization’s 
activity
440
. Nichols’ analysis went further, noticing that in the mind of Italian people, 
Red Brigades terrorists tended to coincide with the Communists, although the utter 
contempt displayed by its members for the Italian Communist Party. 
‘The Times’ correspondent considerations proved to be true. Indeed, the ‘confusion 
over red terrorists’ caused drastic cuts in Communist votes in the local elections held in 
the aftermath of Moro’s death
441
. According Armstrong’s comments the votes 
previously gone to the Communist were distributed between the Italian Socialist and the 
Christian Democrats. 
Such a trend was reinforced in the general election held in June 1979. Law and order 
during the election campaign proved to be an issue of great concern, actually not only 
for terrorist attacks but also for ordinary crimes. British diplomats alongside with 
correspondents in Italy noticed that a real electoral fight was taking place between the 
Christian Democrats and the Communists. The former were accusing the latter of being 
the ideological progenitor of the leftist terrorism and as a consequence, the Italian 
Communist Party got defensive, arguing that the Italian terrorist phenomenon was the 
outcome of thirty years of bad government by the Christian Democracy
442
. 
Reports of Italy in 1979 seemed rather alarming both in British articles and in the 
Annual Review written by the Foreign Office. The terrorist activity’s perception was 
worsened by the lack of an effective Government ̶ even the work of the General Carlo 
Alberto Dalla Chiesa, ‘the flamboyant head of the Anti-Terrorist Brigade’, seemed 
ineffective against the increasing terrorist attacks
443
. Terrorism in this year meant 
predominantly leftist assaults, but right-wing organizations were also active, although 
they did not dominate the newspaper headlines. 
Even when in August 1980, a bomb placed by neo-Fascists blew up at Bologna Centrale 
railway station in Bologna, killing eighty-five people and injuring over two-hundred, 
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this event was considered less significant than the series of attacks perpetrated against 
the establishment by the left-wing organizations
444
. 
An article of ‘The Times’ appeared in 1981 with the headline ‘A decade of terror under 
Red Brigades’
445
 was explanatory of the prominence achieved by the leftist terrorist 
organizations compared to their right-wing counterparts. Thus, over a decade the Italian 
background had completely overturned ̶ the dominant position of the neo-Fascists in the 
British news described at the beginning of the paragraph was replaced by the total 
monopoly of the Red Brigades. 
Nonetheless, a remarkable aspect is the trust the UK placed in the Italian country, 
despite of its critical conditions during the 1970s. There was not a single Annual 
Review by the Foreign Office, from 1978 on, that did not end with a final reference to 
the Italian ingenuity in coping with difficulties, whatever they were. 
The British diplomatic Campbell, in his last Annual Review of Italy, dating back to the 
annus horribilis, commented that despite the dramatic events he found Italians in a 
better shape than the previous year, with the only exception of the Communists ̶ which 
suffered from the unfavourable publicity of the Red Brigades and in that year lost their 
main interlocutor. Furthermore, the British press was not less confident about Italian 
society’s ability to cheer itself up and oppose such a violence ̶ ‘more than most other 
people, they understand that some consummation of political theory in the 
indeterminate future does not justify sickening cruelty now’
446
, Armstrong’s comments 
on Italians’ position after Moro’s murder. 
Paradoxically, reports from 1979 were less optimistic. The new British diplomat of the 
Foreign Office, Ronald Arculus, could hardly report something positive of the country 
in his review. The Italian society ̶ ‘badly hit by terrorism and strikes’ ̶ was led by a 
Government dominated by uncertainty and instability
447
. In the Italian industries a tense 
climate was palpable: ‘[…] employers travel[ed] in protected cars and [took] security 
precautions, for they [were] liable to be knee-capped and kidnapped’
448
. Yet, Arculus 
commented that the Italian industry was actually dynamic and suggested that exporters 
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from the UK should not be afraid of news coming from Italy ̶ always reporting of a 




At the beginning of the new decade, the situation in Italy did not improve, quite the 
opposite. The urban terrorism insistently kept on its activities and, it was assessed that it 
had the hallmarks of both the left-wing and right-wing organizations. Because of the 
perpetration of violence and the Government’s inability to cope with it, alongside with 
its perpetual instability, Italy gained the recognition of ‘sick society’
450
. 
Yet, despite of the worried tone, Great Britain regarded the collapse of the democratic 
government an event remote to happen and acknowledged the importance Italy had 
internationally, especially in the Community context.  
In conclusion, here are some representative words from the British diplomat Ronald 
Arculus which convey at the best Great Britain’s attitude towards Italy
451
: 
The new Russian Ambassador, Lunkov, said to me that he was going to find Rome uphill work 
after London. I said he was right. 1980 has been a bad year and the Italians are fed up with their 
politics as are the poor foreign ambassadors who try to interpret this Byzantine scene to their 
governments. Italy is in many respects a sick society. […] There is a widespread feeling that the 
present system must be changed, but little sign of what Pertini calls disparagingly the ‘political 
classes’ being ready to do it. The prospects for 1981 are not bright. On the other hand the Italians 
have an extraordinary capacity for makeshift and survival. At all events, they remain of 
considerable importance to us in NATO and the EC. However patchy their performance in 1980 
[…] we shall need them, for better or for worse, in 1981.       
  















The aim of this thesis was to show Britain’s concern over law and order in Italy during 
the 1970s and point out London’s attitude towards the Italian terrorist phenomenon. 
In this decade, Italy experienced a period of political and social unrest, that worried its 
Western allies. The instability of its governments and the increasing popularity of the 
Italian Communist Party were considered an alarming threat by the American 
superpower. 
When the PCI gained a considerable 34% in the 1976 general elections, the USA 
promoted drastic measures to hinder Communists’ climb. In the Puerto Rico Summit in 
1976, the heads of State of the USA, France, Germany and Great Britain met in order to 
discuss the ‘Italian case’. Among conditions for international aids, the exclusion of the 
PCI from a coalition government was required. 
Yet, Great Britain did not regard Italian Communists a serious problem and considered 
a ‘Red Government’ not even a remote possibility. Instead, what worried HMG was the 
increasing political violence that was erupting in the Italian society. The Italian terrorist 
phenomenon was an issue of considerable relevance for London, since it kept 
undermining an allied country that was already weak because of the economic and 
political crisis. 
Despite the unsteady status of its domestic politics, Italy had an important role for Great 
Britain in the international context, especially in the European integration. 
Italy actively supported the British membership of the EEC, for several reasons. Firstly, 
Great Britain could counterweight the dominant influence of France and West-
Germany. Secondly, both of the two states aimed at levelling clear disparities in the 
Economic Community. The Common Agricultural Policy was the first target on their 
agenda, but it was a controversial issue because a change of it could undermine French 
profits. Yet, as it was conceived, the CAP costed to Italy and Great Britain more than 
they benefited. A further shared objective was the strengthening of the European funds 
to reduce the development gap among regional areas of the member States. For this 
purpose, Italy and Britain promoted the establishment of a Regional Development Fund. 
The close cooperation in reforming the Community, justifies the British concern for the 
increasing turmoil in Italy. 
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At the beginning of the decade, the British press reported on series of attacks carried out 
by far right-wing groups, which were suspected to be linked to the Italian Social 
Movement (MSI). According to the articles, the party’s strategy was to create serious 
disorder, in order that the MSI could base its 1972 election campaign on the restoration 
of law and order. Originally, the violent upheaval was considered by the British articles 
as the outcome of heightened tension between right-wing and left-wing extremists, 
rather than an attempt at overthrowing the Italian political system. 
The abduction and murder of the Christian Democracy’s President Aldo Moro in 1978 
changed the British opinion on political violence in Italy. Whereas the Red Brigades’ 
activity was considered delirious by the Italian press, the British did not underestimate 
their danger. Despite the situation of law and order in Italy was serious, observers from 
Great Britain never regarded a coup d'état likely. Italians, according to them, had natural 
antibodies against authoritarian overthrow thanks to the recent experience of the Fascist 
period. 
Positive comments were also shared by the British diplomats in Italy, who regarded 
Italians as resilient people that could tackle politic crisis and social problems thanks to 
their ingenuity. Their accounts on Italy, since the kidnapping of the Christian 
democratic President, always included reports on terrorism. Though worries were 
expressed about the worsening situation, the tone was never alarming. Instead, there 
was the desire to understand the origin of such a long-lasting phenomenon deeply 
imbedded in the society. 
In conclusion, the interest of London in the political and social crisis in Italy was 
considerable. British officers and journalists provided Great Britain with detailed and 
clear-sighted accounts that went beyond prejudices. Though worries were constantly 
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Riassunto in lingua italiana 
L’Italia negli anni Settanta 
L’Italia degli anni Settanta è stata oggetto di numerosi studi accademici; tuttavia 
l’attenzione degli studiosi si è focalizzata principalmente sulla politica interna e la storia 
culturale ed economica del paese, tralasciando il suo ruolo nel contesto internazionale di 
quegli anni. Eppure l’Italia non è stata unicamente un mero oggetto del sistema 
internazionale, bensì anche un attore attivo, in grado di influire nelle questioni mondiali 
dell’epoca. 
Il ruolo internazionale del Paese si manifesta in quattro diverse dimensioni: nel conflitto 
della Guerra Fredda, il suo apporto nell’integrazione europea, la sua presenza al G7 e 
infine, il peso avuto nel contesto mediterraneo e nella questione del Medio-Oriente. 
Per quanto riguarda la posizione italiana nel contesto della Guerra Fredda, il governo 
democristiano non ha mai messo in discussione la partecipazione dell’Italia al Patto 
Atlantico, e allo stesso modo l’alleanza del paese con gli Stati Uniti. 
Tuttavia, la presenza del più grande e influente Partito Comunista dell’Europa 
Occidentale, rendeva l’Italia un caso difficile da gestire. Quando nel 1976 le elezioni 
politiche in Italia confermarono il supporto di cui godevano i comunisti, gli Stati Uniti 
ritennero urgente la convocazione di un incontro tra le quattro maggiori nazioni alleate 
per concordare una strategia comune di fronte al rischio di un governo con esponenti 
comunisti in un paese così strategico come l’Italia. Il summit di Puerto Rico del 1976 
vide d’accordo gli USA, la Francia, la Repubblica Federale Tedesca e la Gran Bretagna ̶ 
anche se quest’ultima mostrerà delle riserve ̶ non solo nell’esclusione dei Comunisti 
dall’area di governo, ma anche nell’adozione da parte dell’Italia di determinate misure 
economiche, atte ad intervenire sui problemi strutturali dell’economia e della società 
italiana. 
Il secondo ambito in cui il peso dell’Italia si è distinto è il processo dell’integrazione 
europea, che agli inizi degli anni Settanta vide l’ampliamento della Comunità 
Economica a Danimarca, Irlanda e Regno Unito. Riguardo quest’ultimo, l’Italia si 
dimostrò da subito sostenitrice della sua adesione alla Comunità, poiché riteneva che la 
presenza della Gran Bretagna avrebbe fornito un valido contrappeso al potere della 
Repubblica Federale Tedesca e della Francia. Inoltre, sin dai negoziati per l’ingresso del 
Regno Unito, le due nazioni stabilirono come obiettivo comune la promozione delle 
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politiche regionali, volte a limitare il divario tra zone sviluppate e aree rurali nei paesi 
membri; a tale scopo, si istituì il Fondo Europeo di sviluppo Regionale, il quale tuttavia 
subì costanti rallentamenti nel corso del decennio a causa di aspre dispute riguardo il 
suo finanziamento. Le polemiche investirono anche il progetto di riforma della Politica 
Agricola Comunitaria, CAP, fortemente voluto da Italia e Gran Bretagna. 
Un ulteriore aspetto fondamentale del processo di integrazione fu l’istituzione del 
Sistema Monetario Europeo, lo SME, considerato il primo passo significativo verso 
l’unione monetaria ed economica europea. Inizialmente l’Italia aveva spalleggiato la 
Gran Bretagna nelle trattative per la sua introduzione, decidendo di non aderirvi quando 
questa fu discussa nel Consiglio Europeo del dicembre 1978. I motivi dietro questa 
decisione erano molteplici, riguardanti principalmente la politica interna del paese. 
Tuttavia, nella bilancia internazionale il peso maggiore propendeva verso l’adesione 
allo SME: considerando la crisi della distensione tra Washington  e Mosca, l’adesione al 
Sistema Monetario avrebbe rafforzato la posizione dell’Italia all’interno dell’alleanza 
occidentale. Nonostante le resistenze, dunque, l’Italia aderì allo SME, il quale entrò in 
vigore il 13 Marzo 1979. 
Il processo integrativo fu perseguito anche all’interno delle Istituzioni Europee, 
promuovendo sin dagli inizi degli anni Settanta, l’elezione diretta del Parlamento della 
Comunità Economica. L’atteggiamento della penisola nei confronti di questo aspetto si 
rivelò sempre coerente: l’Italia, infatti, aveva da sempre supportato il progetto di 
un’integrazione europea secondo principi federalisti, ritenendo che l’integrazione 
economica dovesse andare di pari passo a quella politica. Differentemente 
dall’approvazione dello SME, la ratifica del suffragio universale per il Parlamento 
europeo non trovò alcuna opposizione. 
Al di fuori del contesto europeo, l’Italia dovette lottare per ottenere un riconoscimento 
all’interno delle iniziative dei quattro maggiori paesi industrializzati dell’Occidente. La 
sua situazione d’instabilità politica e d’incertezza economica la relegavano ad essere un 
oggetto isolato nel contesto dei summit tra USA, Repubblica Federale Tedesca, Francia 
e Gran Bretagna. Nel caso del summit di Rambouillet, il primo incontro economico tra i 
maggiori vertici occidentali, l’Italia dovette azionare la sua macchina diplomatica per 
poter garantire la sua partecipazione; un’eventuale esclusione dai vertici internazionali 
avrebbe gravemente minato una situazione già precaria. Fu la grave situazione in cui 
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versava la sua politica interna che convinse i maggiori paesi occidentali ad acconsentire 
alla partecipazione dell’Italia. Il crescente avanzamento del Partito Comunista, sancito 
dalle elezione del giugno 1976, e la sua possibile partecipazione al governo italiano 
rappresentarono il controverso caso da discutere al Summit di Puerto Rico nell’estate 
dello stesso anno. In quell’occasione si vollero legare i problemi economici alle 
situazioni politiche, cosicché gli aiuti economici da destinare all’Italia fossero 
corrisposti solo in caso dell’esclusione dei Comunisti dall’area di governo. 
Per compensare all’inefficace azione in ambito internazionale, il governo italiano 
concentrò i suoi sforzi verso i negoziati con i paesi del Mediterraneo e del Medio-
Oriente. In questo contesto, si fece promotore di un progetto simile alla Conferenza 
sulla Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa, con lo scopo di mantenere la pace e il 
progresso economico nei paesi di quest’area. Tuttavia, l’interconnessione tra la 
cooperazione con i paesi arabi e la questione palestinese rendeva difficoltosa ogni 
negoziazione. Nel contesto della Guerra dello Yom-Kippur, l’Italia si fece promotrice di 
un dialogo Euro-Arabo che non sortì gli effetti sperati, poiché gli arabi perseveravano 
ad associare alle trattative contenuti politici, laddove la Comunità Economica concepiva 
accordi relativi ai solo ambiti economici e culturali. Nonostante gli assidui tentativi del 
governo italiano di promuovere politiche coordinate tra i paesi membri della Comunità, 
le altre nazioni continuavano a muoversi individualmente. Inoltre, ogni tentativo di 
azioni comuni era radicalmente stigmatizzato dall’amministrazione statunitense, la 
quale temeva, così, uno scavalcamento del Patto Atlantico. 
Come ogni azione in campo estero condotta dall’Italia nel corso di questo decennio, 
anche la politica sul Mediterraneo e Medio-Oriente fu compromessa dalle pressioni 
interne. A partire dal 1976, l’influenza di Washington divenne più persistente, cosicché 
ogni passo fu soppesato in base al volere degli Stati Uniti e delle categorie della Guerra 
Fredda, anche per quanto riguardava le questioni Mediterranee. 
La Gran Bretagna negli anni Settanta 
La Gran Bretagna degli anni Settanta, come l’Italia, affrontava una severa crisi 
economica congiunta a frequenti disordini: gli scioperi rappresentavano una costante e i 
sindacati godevano di un crescente potere. Sotto il governo di James Callaghan 
l’instabilità sociale si fece ingestibile, tanto che la fine del 1978 e l’inizio del 1979 
passarono alla storia come ‘the winter of discontent’, l’inverno del malcontento. 
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Tali sollevazioni indebolirono la credibilità del paese in ambito internazionale, andando 
a minare delle relazioni da tempo consolidate; il rapporto con il suo ‘special partner’, gli 
Stati Uniti, ne fu un esempio. 
Durante quello che venne definito dal segretario di Stato americano, Henry Kissinger, 
l’’anno dell’Europa’, l’amministrazione Nixon pose grande fiducia nel ruolo della Gran 
Bretagna, neo membro della Comunità Economica Europea. La rinnovata attenzione 
verso la Comunità Europea prevedeva, concretamente, la stesura di una rinnovata Carta 
Atlantica che avrebbe dotato gli alleati di una nuova Dichiarazione di Principi. Dietro 
questa mossa si celava, da parte statunitense, l’obiettivo di legare gli accordi economici 
con l’Europa alle questioni di sicurezza militare che costituivano i rapporti tra gli USA e 
la CEE. Questo nuovo sviluppo diplomatico era connesso con il recente ampliamento 
della Comunità alla Gran Bretagna, Irlanda e Danimarca: il loro ingresso permetteva la 
progettazione di accordi economici più ambiziosi, come ad esempio il Sistema 
Monetario Europeo, il quale, agli occhi degli Stati Uniti, rappresentava una seria 
minaccia all’economia americana. 
L’amministrazione americana contava sul proprio ‘partner speciale’ per sviluppare la 
Dichiarazione di Principi, prevedendo una collaborazione esclusiva US-UK. La 
cooperazione a due fu rifiutata dal governo conservatore di Edward Heath, il quale 
preferì coinvolgere nelle trattative anche gli altri Stati membri della Comunità. Inoltre, il 
nuovo progetto della Dichiarazione dei Principi, così concepito, includeva una riforma 
monetaria che avrebbe minacciato la politica economica comunitaria. L’atteggiamento 
disfattista nei confronti delle proposte americane costò alla Gran Bretagna la fiducia 
dell’alleato. Tuttavia, questo non fu l’unico episodio che mise alla prova la relazione tra 
le due potenze: la crisi in Medio-Oriente, infatti, costituì un ulteriore terreno di scontro. 
La posizione di neutralità assunta dalla Gran Bretagna durante la guerra dello Yom 
Kippur nel 1973, irritò fortemente gli alleati americani, i quali da allora riconsiderarono 
l’entità della ‘relazione speciale’ con il Regno Unito. Da parte americana, si capì che il 
paese inglese avrebbe sempre anteposto l’unità della Comunità alla cooperazione con 
gli Stati Uniti, a meno che non fosse stata in aperta opposizione con i propri interessi. 
I contatti tra i due paesi si intensificarono nuovamente nella seconda metà del decennio, 
quando il pericolo comunista iniziò ad affacciarsi nella sponda mediterranea 
dell’Europa, con la Rivoluzione dei Garofani in Portogallo e l’avanzata comunista in 
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Italia. L’amministrazione americana trovò nell’alleato inglese un interlocutore 
collaborativo, ma soprattutto un osservatore più lucido della situazione italiana. 
Sebbene l’analisi inglese fosse meno allarmistica di quella statunitense, e le continue 
ingerenze della superpotenza nella politica interna italiana lasciassero perplesso un 
paese liberal-democratico quale la Gran Bretagna, essa accettò di discutere il ‘caso 
italiano’ nel meeting di Rambouillet del 1975. 
Le negoziazioni portate avanti all’interno della Comunità Economica furono altrettanto 
travagliate: a causa del veto posto dal Presidente francese Charles De Gaulle e di 
opposizione interne al Parlamento inglese, la Gran Bretagna dovette ritardare il suo 
ingresso nella CEE fino al 1973. Il suo ingresso fu salutato con favore soprattutto 
dall’Italia che vi vide un utile contrappeso all’eccessiva influenza franco-tedesca nelle 
sorti della Comunità. Tra Gran Bretagna e Italia vi era un generale accordo su diversi 
aspetti: dall’implemento della politica regionale comunitaria alla riforma delle 
istituzioni europee. Tuttavia le due nazioni non sempre assegnarono lo stesso peso ai 
progetti concordati: per quanto riguarda la riforma delle istituzioni, il punto di vista 
della Gran Bretagna fu sempre piuttosto prudente; prima di procedere al rafforzamento 
del Parlamento Comunitario, bisognava stabilirne i suoi confini, per non incorrere nel 
rischio di cedere un eccessivo potere. Una migliore distribuzione dei fondi monetari 
europei, assieme alla riforma della Politica Agricola Comune videro Gran Bretagna e 
Italia cooperare fianco a fianco, sebbene il loro esito non fu quello sperato a causa di 
circostanze contingenti la crisi Medio-Orientale. 
Il progetto del Fondo Regionale e di riforma della Politica Agricola Comune non furono 
gli unici ambiti di collaborazione tra i due paesi nel contesto europeo. L’iniziativa del 
Sistema Monetario Europeo, lo SME, comportò numerose consultazioni tra Gran 
Bretagna e Italia; tali negoziazioni avrebbero potuto portare a dei successi significativi 
anche nei sopracitati progetti, se solo il dibattito non avesse avuto luogo durante un 
periodo cupo per entrambi i paesi. 
Nonostante le sue condizioni di ‘malato d’Europa’, la Gran Bretagna fece parte delle 
quattro nazioni riunite per discutere le misure da imporre all’Italia per evitare che i 
Comunisti ricoprissero delle posizioni governative. Sebbene il governo britannico fosse 
preoccupato dalla possibilità di una partecipazione comunista all’esecutivo italiano, si 
dimostrò perplesso di fronte all’aperta interferenza dei maggiori paesi occidentali sulla 
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politica interna italiana. Secondo il punto di vista britannico, gli Usa, la Francia e la 
Repubblica Federale Tedesca avevano ideato un programma anacronistico, il quale 
comportava una riforma della politica sui redditi e tagli alla spesa pubblica, impossibili 
senza il coinvolgimento del Partito Comunista. 
Violenza politica: una ricostruzione introduttiva delle Brigate Rosse 
Il terrorismo interno si manifestò in Italia tra la fine degli anni Sessanta, protraendosi 
per l’intero decennio degli anni Settanta, con strascichi negli anni successivi. 
Esso rappresentò un fenomeno peculiare, poiché non riconducibile ad un’unica matrice 
e perché profondamente radicato nella società italiana. Per quanto riguarda il primo 
aspetto, una prima distinzione possibile per catalogare tale fenomeno interessa la sua 
origine ideologica: il terrorismo ‘nero’ fu ispirato da un’origine neo-fascista, laddove il 
terrorismo ‘rosso’ presentò una matrice marxista-leninista. Il primo risale agli albori 
della Guerra Fredda ma le sue azioni erano sporadiche. 
Per quanto riguarda il cosiddetto terrorismo ‘rosso’, l’organizzazione che monopolizzò 
la categoria, a partire dalla seconda metà degli anni Settanta, furono le Brigate Rosse. 
Infatti, sebbene fossero presenti una miriade di gruppi attivi nel decennio considerato, le 
Brigate Rosse si resero protagoniste di una serie di campagne terroristiche che ebbero 
come culmine l’attacco allo Stato italiano attraverso il rapimento e l’uccisione 
dell’allora Presidente della Democrazia Cristiana, Aldo Moro. 
La loro fondazione, risalente all’agosto del 1970, avvenne ad opera di alcuni esponenti 
di Sinistra Proletaria e Collettivo politico metropolitano in provincia di Reggio Emilia, 
per rispondere all’esigenza di una maggiore coordinazione tra gruppi eversivi. 
Nella strategia delle Brigate Rosse, le operazioni condotte dal gruppo si distribuirono in 
due principali fasi, caratterizzate ciascuna da un differente target: la prima fase, 
corrispondente al periodo iniziale dell’organizzazione, prevedeva attacchi rivolti agli 
impianti delle maggiori industrie del Nord Italia ̶ Sit-Siemens,Pirelli, Alfa Romeo e 
FIAT ̶ o ancora, rapimenti a danno dei dirigenti di tali imprese; la seconda fase, avviata 
a partire dal 1974, coincise con il rapimento del magistrato Mario Sossi, Pubblico 
Ministero al processo contro il gruppo sovversivo XXII Ottobre. Con tale sequestro 
ebbe inizio il cosiddetto ‘attacco al cuore dello Stato’ che avrebbe visto il suo pieno 
adempimento nel rapimento e uccisione del Presidente democristiano Aldo Moro, 
ritenuto responsabile della politica del ‘compromesso storico’, ovvero la collaborazione 
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tra il Partito Comunista e la Democrazia Cristiana per l’attuazione di un programma che 
potesse risanare l’economia e la società italiane. 
L’insorgere della violenza politica: una prospettiva britannica 
Il fenomeno terroristico italiano destò grande attenzione anche nell’alleato britannico, il 
quale, a partire dal 1978, anno dello sconvolgimento politico seguito al caso Moro, 
richiese ai propri diplomatici costanti aggiornamenti sulla situazione dell’ordine 
pubblico nella penisola. 
Dalle analisi dei funzionari britannici emergeva uno scenario sicuramente grave, 
tuttavia privo degli allarmismi provenienti dalla diplomazia statunitense. Da parte di 
Londra si riscontrava l’intenzione di indagare le origini del fenomeno per poter 
comprendere una realtà che nel corso degli anni aveva mutato continuamente aspetto. 
Dalle ricostruzioni effettuate grazie all’analisi degli articoli dei tre giornali britannici 
‘The Times’, ‘The Guardian’ e ‘The Observer’ è possibile riscontrare una prima fase del 
terrorismo italiano di stampo neo-fascista. Tuttavia, inizialmente, gli scontri e i 
disordini di piazza venivano interpretati dalla stampa inglese più come il prodotto di 
tensioni politiche tra i gruppi estremisti della destra e della sinistra extra-parlamentare, 
piuttosto che come dei tentativi di sovvertire l’ordine democratico del paese. Ancora a 
metà degli anni Settanta, i movimenti neofascisti monopolizzavano il racconto della 
violenza: nei giornali di Londra essi erano i protagonisti e gli artefici dei disordini che 
infiammavano il paese; negli scontri, i riottosi di estrema sinistra, al contrario, venivano 
documentati come vittime innocenti della furia incontrollata neofascista. La narrazione 
della violenza politica muta a partire dal 1976, anno del primo processo ai capi storici 
delle Brigate Rosse che subirà continui slittamenti dovuti al rifiuto degli imputati ad 
avere dei difensori di ufficio e alle loro reiterate minacce ai membri della giuria. Da 
questo momento la stampa inglese metterà in primo piano le attività terroristiche 
dell’organizzazione di Mario Moretti, seguendone le sorti anche nel decennio 
successivo. 
Il caso Moro fu seguito con profonda attenzione da Londra, e quando questo si concluse 
drammaticamente, le reazioni dal mondo anglosassone furono di stima nei confronti del 
governo italiano, il quale si dimostrò capace di reagire con fermezza agli attacchi 
terroristici contro le proprie istituzioni. 
130 
 
Nonostante il plauso per la risoluta gestione dell’accaduto, gli osservatori inglesi 
riconoscevano che il governo di unità nazionale costituito all’indomani del rapimento 
del Presidente democristiano, non possedeva solide basi per resistere. 
Sebbene i resoconti dei diplomatici trasmettevano la gravità della situazione, i toni non 
risultarono mai allarmati: al contrario, veniva sempre fatto appello alla resilienza e 
ingegnosità del popolo italiano, confermando che non avrebbe ceduto alla minaccia 
terroristica.              
 
